需求不确定下零售商主导的供应链协调问题研究.pdfVIP

摘要 随着经济的发展以及市场由卖方市场向买方市场的转移，零售商作为市场信息的直接 反馈者在供应链中逐渐取代了传统的制造商的核心地位，成为了核心企业。由于供应链各 成员间彼此信息不对称，处于核心地位的企业对供应链的其他成员的决策有着很大的影响 作用，而由于供应链成员处于不同的利益集团，本身都会为了追求自身利益最大化而努力， 却往往与供应链的整体收益相冲突，这就需要有一定的机制对整个供应链进行协调，才能 共同提升供应链整体绩效。 本文研究了零售商主导的由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链在需求不确 定下的协调问题。 首先，构建了普通契约下的各方期望收益模型，运用 Stackelberg 博弈分析了使得处 于主导地位的零售商期望收益最大的各决策变量的取值，并运用Matlab 软件进行数值模 拟，分析了需求价格弹性因子在不同取值下各决策变量的取值和各方收益的最优解。 其次，构建利润共享契约下的各方期望收益模型，并且引入了回购价格，通过分析论 证，求得此契约下的供应链整体期望收益及各方收益均大于普通契约下的情形，说明此契 约能很好地协调此供应链。 关键字：需求不确定；零售商主导；供应链协调；需求价格弹性 I Abstract With the development of economy, the market transfer from seller’s market to buyer’s market. As the direct respondent to the market information, retailers replaced the traditional manufacturer in supply chain and became the core enterprise gradually. Because of the information asymmetry among members in supply chain, the core enterprise is influencing the others on the decision making in supply chain. Meanwhile, because the members in the supply chain who are at different interest groups will make efforts to maximize their self- interest, which are in conflict with the whole supply chain profit . So, a certain mechanism is needed for the coordination of the whole supply chain so as to raise the overall performance of the supply chain. This paper studies the coordination problem of a two-stage retailer- leading supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under the condition of demand uncertainty. Firstly, we build the expected return model of all members under the normal contract, using Stackelberg game to analyze the values of various decision variables that maximize the expected return of the retailers and using Matlab to numerical simulation, which analyze the