基于EVA的企业经营者薪酬机制实证研究毕业论文.doc

本 科 毕 业 论 文 题 目 基于EVA的企业经营者薪酬机制的实证研究 学 院 专 业 财 务 管 理 班 级 学 号 学生姓名 指导教师 摘 要 所有权与经营权的分离使委托代理问题出现，从而经营者与股东利益未能达成一致，“逆向选择”与“道德风险”也日益尖锐。现代企业治理的核心内容就是关于经营者人力资本的激励与约束机制，不仅仅是因为经营者对于组织发展的特殊作用，而且经营者自身的需求也同样决定了对其激励是非常有必要的。薪酬激励是经营者激励中最为根本且较为有效地手段。实践证明， EVA（经济增加值）弥补了很多传统财务指标的缺陷，能够有效的完成激励与约束的目的。 本文首先对EVA的由来和概念作阐述，并且将其与传统的财务指标进行比较，得出使用EVA的优势。然后描述我国人力资源面临的挑战以及企业薪酬激励机制的现状，在此基础上，介绍如何将EVA应用到薪酬机制当中，从而真正达到激励的目的。通过对上市公司（雅戈尔集团）2006年~2010年财务数据的实证分析，说明运用EVA薪酬机制的优越性，除此之外还将简单论述在中国企业实施EVA薪酬机制所面临的困难。 关键词：Abstract Ownership and the right of management separation make principal-agent problems, which operators and the interests of the shareholders failed to agree, "adverse choice" and "moral hazard" also increasingly sharp. Modern enterprise management is the core content of human capital on operators incentive and restraint mechanisms, and not just because of the development of undertakings for the organization special role, and operator individual needs also determines the type of the incentive is very necessary. Salary incentive is the most fundamental managers' motivation and more effective means. Practice has proved, Economic value added (EVA) offset many traditional financial indicators, the defects of can effectively finish incentive purpose. This paper firstly expounds the origin and concept of EVA, and comparison with the traditional financial indicators, drawn the advantages of using EVA. Then describe the present situation of our human resources challenges and the enterprise's salary incentive mechanism, based on this, and introduces how to make EVA applied to salary incentive mechanism of incentive, thus achieve true motivation purpose. Through the empirical analysis of the listed companies (You