An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11教程.pdfVIP

The Academy of Political Science 475 Riverside Drive · Suite 1274 · New York, New York 10115-1274 (212) 870-2500 · FAX: (212) 870-2202 · aps@ · POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Volume 121 · Number 1 · Spring 2006 No part of this article may be copied, downloaded, stored, further transmitted, transferred, distributed, altered, or otherwise used, in any form or by any means, except: ß one stored electronic and one paper copy of any article solely for your personal, non- commercial use, or ß with prior written permission of The Academy of Political Science. Political Science Quarterly is published by The Academy of Political Science. Contact the Academy for further permission regarding the use of this work. Political Science Quarterly Copyright © 2006 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved. An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11 AMY B. ZEGART Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. intelligence agencies have faced a firestorm of criticism. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the 9/11 Commission, and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Silberman-Robb Commission) all exposed grave shortcomings in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the thirteen other agencies that comprise the U.S. intelligence community. Although such faultfinding is not new, the stakes have rarely been higher.1 As many observers have noted, the Cold War’s end marked the beginning of a new era in international relations, one in which great power does not bring security. Today, t