分析哲学简介.pptVIP

豆丁人文家园提供文史哲类外文原著 /Gymnopedies * * * * * * * * * * /entries/other-minds/ History It is noteworthy that the other minds problem came to prominence as a philosophical problem only as recently as the nineteenth century, when John Stuart Mill gave us what is generally regarded as a version of the analogical inference to other minds. Mills version has as its centrepiece the causal link between our mental states and our behaviour. The problem was clearly enough waiting to be noted as far back as Descartes and his separation of mind from body and his view that only human animals had minds. However, it does not seem that Descartes noticed it as a separate problem. A similar situation would seem to apply with John Locke, given his belief that the mind of another is invisible (Locke, 111.ii.1,pp.,404-405). Before Mill, it would seem that Thomas Reid (Avramides, 2001, ch., VI) should be credited with seeing that there was a serious philosophical issue concerning other minds. Indeed, it seems that the first frequent use of the words ‘other minds’ is to be credited to him (Somerville, 1989, p. 249). However, those minds are not observable. Nor is our belief that they exist to be reached or supported by reasoning. For Reid it is self-evident, an innate belief, that there are minds other than ones own. The analogical inference to other minds held sway until about the middle of the twentieth century. Increasingly argued to be problematic, the analogical inference lost ground within philosophy. It was widely thought to be inadequate because of two of its features. The first was that the conclusion was not only uncheckable but was such that it was logically impossible to check up on it. The second was that the argument seemed to be an inductive generalisation based on one only case. This second feature was thought to be problematic in itself but was thought by many to have as a consequence that each of us learns from our own case what it is to be in pain or some other mental stat