a recursion relation for the probability of the paradox of voting：投票悖论概率的递推关系.pdfVIP

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 18, 318-327 (1978) A Recursion Relation for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting RAPHAEL GILLETT Department of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester, LEI 7RH. England Received September 14, 1977; revised March 8, 1978 For alternatives xi, i = l,..., m, giving rise to m! linear preference orderings of which one is selected independently by each of N voters, a recursion relation is developed which expresses the probability that xi is the Condorcet winner when there are N voters in terms of the probability of this event when there are N - 1 voters. Hence the probabilities of the paradox of voting when N is odd, and of Condorcet indecision when N is even may be obtained. The relationship holds for any set of probabilities, or culture, governing the selection of the preference orderings by the voters. 1. TNTRoDUCTI~N If a group of N memberswishes to select one of m alternative coursesof action, the Condorcet collective decision-making criterion declares the group choice to be that alternative which defeatseach of the others in turn on a simple majority voting basis. However, it sometimes happens that no Condorcet winner emerges: That is, each alternative loses to some other alternative. Such an eventuality is known as the paradox of voting and expressions providing the precise likelihood of its occurrence in