a related key impossible differential attack against 22 rounds of the lightweight block cipher lblock：一个关键的不可能差分攻击22轮lblock轻量级分组密码.pdfVIP

Information Processing Letters 112 (2012) 624–629 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Information Processing Letters /locate/ipl A related key impossible differential attack against 22 rounds of the lightweight block cipher LBlock ✩ Marine Minier a,∗, María Naya-Plasencia b a Université de Lyon, INRIA, CITI, F-69621, France b University of Versailles, France a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Article history: LBlock is a new lightweight block cipher proposed by Wu and Zhang (2011) [12] at ACNS Received 8 February 2012 2011. It is based on a modified 32-round Feistel structure. It uses keys of length 80 bits Received in revised form 18 April 2012 and message blocks of length 64 bits. Accepted 23 April 2012 In this letter, we examine the security arguments given in the original article and we show Available online 15 May 2012 that we can improve the impossible differential attack given in the original article on 20 Communicated by D. Pointcheval rounds by constructing a 22-round related key impossible differential attack that relies Keywords: on intrinsic weaknesses of the key schedule. This attack has a complexity of 270 cipher Analysis of algorithms operations using 247 plaintexts. This result was already published in Minier and Naya- Cryptography