考虑广告合作的非对称信息双渠道供应链的定价决策1.docVIP

PAGE  PAGE 15 考虑零售商风险偏好信息的双渠道供应链广告 合作与定价决策 邹清明 王玉川* 南华大学经济管理学院，湖南，衡阳，421001 摘要：在一个制造商与一个零售商构成的双渠道供应链中，考察供应链参与者的风险规避度与广告合作对供应链定价决策的影响。在零售商风险规避度是完全信息与非对称信息结构下，得到了供应链的最优直销价、批发价与零售价，发现不同水平的广告投入，有不同形式的最优定价决策。探讨了最优直销价、批发价与零售价与广告投入、风险规避度、零售市场份额的关系，比较了两种信息结构下供应链的定价决策。利用数值算例，验证理论结果。结果表明，在非对称信息下，当制造商高估零售商风险规避度时，直销价与批发价会增加，而零售价会降低，有利于制造商攫取更多供应链的收益，因此，在博弈过程中，零售商应充分暴露自己的风险规避态度。 关键词：双渠道；非对称信息；风险规避度；广告合作；定价决策； Cooperative Advertising and Pricing Decision in a Dual Channel Supply Chain Considering the Information of Retailer’s Risk Preference Zou Qingming Wang Yuchuan School of Economics and Management, University of South China, Hengyang, Hunan, 421001 Abstract: In a dual channel supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, this paper studies the influence of participants’ risk-aversion measure and cooperative advertising on price-making decision. The optimal direct-channel price, the optimal wholesale price and the optimal retailer price are obtained when the retailer’s risk-aversion measure is complete information and asymmetric information respectively. It is found that there exist different optimal pricing solutions as the advertising expenditure is in different levels. This paper investigates the relationship between the optimal direct-channel price, the optimal wholesale price, the optimal retailer price and the advertising expenditure, the participants’ risk-aversion measure and the retail market share. The pricing decision under both information structures is compared. The theoretical results are proven by using numerical example. The results show that, under the asymmetric information, when the manufacturer overestimates the retailer’s risk-aversion measure, the optimal direct-channel price and the optimal wholesale price will increase, while the optimal retailer price will decrease. It is useful for the manufacturer to grab more of the supply chain revenue. Therefore, retaile