基于矿业监管博弈的激励约束机制研究.pdfVIP

越水银 3 期 基于矿业监管博弈的激励约束机制研究 刘香玲，魏晓平 (中阂矿业大学管理学院，江苏徐州 221佣8) 摘要:资源型城市地方政府在执行矿业监管权时，通常由于信息不对称及矿业政策执行力度也围限定与中央政府博弈。 基于由此导致的矿业生产外部蚀，通过分析中央政府与地方政府各自的目标偏好和效益函数，利用经济博葬论和矩阵对策， 试图寻求矿业监督存在问题的原因。文章尝试在利用行为经济学前景理论建模的基础上，借助贝叶斯坦论分析，提出贝 叶斯风险成本诱导机制，进而得出在该机制的激励约求下矿业监管倾向于中自1在托有效。文章最后综合研究结论给出政策建议， 为制定我阁的能源资源开采政策提供了爱类的竣论参考。 关键词:矿业监管;诱导机制;博4半场;投机行为;风险成本 中团分提号: C931 ，口侃 文献标识码:A 文章锦号:10例币292X( 2010 )03刊削8叶4 A Study on Incentive and RI臼traint Mechanism b剧ed on Mining Supervision Game LIU xia吨随吨， WEI Xiao阳ping (Scbool of Management of Cbina University of Mining and T创bnol，咽y， Xuzbou Jia吨酬221008， cb阳) Abs衍act: When local government in resourc• hased city implements mining regulations of supervision 邸 a deputy of the central govemment during Economy in Transition, adverse spec川剧ons often occur as a re喝ult of asymmetric infonnation and the limited extent of mining policy enforcement . Based on the resulting negative extemalitie日， this paper tried to 仙ld reωons for the problem of mining supervision by the use of the meth巾。f game theo巧 and matrix counterm栅w冒出m吨h the respective analysis of objective preferences and efficiency 缸nctions of central govemment and Iωal govemment. Then the paper bu讯t a model ba日ed on prospect 由eory of Behavioral Economics and developed an induced mechanism of Bayesian risk-cost by the m叫eling analysis, and concluded 出at Mining supervision tended to be Pareto Efficiency under this mechanis恤， lncentive and restrictive force.ηle paper last @且ves policy proposals ,which will play a thωretical reference 缸nction in formulating ene嗨yreωurc创 exploitation policies. Key words: Mining supervision; An induced mechanism; Game bound; Speculative Behavior; 四e risk…c08t