基于竞争博弈的并购DCF价值评估方法优化研究.pdfVIP

第 22 卷第 3 期 系统管理学报 Vo l. 22 No. 3 2013 年 5 月 Journal of Systems . Management May 2013 文章编号:1005-2542(2013)03-0366-05 基于竞争博弈的并购 DCF 价值评估方法优化研究 刘洪久1 ， 2 ， 马卫民2 ， 胡彦蓉l (1.常熟理工学院管理学院，江苏常熟 215500; 2. 同济大学经济与管理学院，上海 200092) E摘要】价值评估是并购决策的关键环节，合理的评估方法有助于并购决策的科学性。并购的价值评估 既要考虑并购的协同效应，又要考虑并购后市场竞争结构变化的影响。以博特兰德模型描述并购后的市场 竞争态势，推导出两企业和 n 个企业条件下市场竞争博弈的纳什均衡，并将均衡结果与贴现现金流理论进行 有机结合，修正了传统理论可能存在的问题，有利于企业更好地进行并购决策。 关键词:竞争博弈;并购;现金流量折现;价值评估 中固分类号:F 275. 5 文献标识码:A Improvemeot DCF for Mergers aod Acquisitioos ßased 00 Competitive Game 1 2 2 1 LIU Hong-jiu • , MA Wei-min , HUYan-rong (1. School of Management , Changshu Institute of Technology , Changshu 215500 , Jiangsu , China; 2. School of Economics and Management , Tongji University , Shanghai , 200092 , China) (Abstract Valuation is the core of decision in mergers and acquisitions. Reasonable methods for valuation make the decision-making process more scientifically. We consider the synergistic effect as well as the change of market structure after mergers and acq l1 isitions. We uses Bertrand model to describe the market competition. Nash equilibriums of two companies and n companies are deducted by combining discounted cash flow mode l. The improvement amends the problems of classical theory and help enterprises execute the strategy of mergers and acquisitions. Key words: competitive game; mergers and acquisitions; discounted cash flow; valuation 并购是企业重要的投资活动，其过程充满了不 DCF 法是在 Fisher 的资本预算理论、Modigliani 和