基于贝叶斯博弈的中国环境污染的监管与治理.pdfVIP

Vo l. 17 NO.6 第 17 卷第6 期 科技与管理 2015 年 11 月 Science-Technology and Management Nov. , 2015 文章编号:1008 -7133(2015)06 -0008 -05 基于贝时斯博弈的申国环境污染的监管与治理 张云辉， 萨如才主 (哈尔滨理工大学经济学院，黑龙江哈尔滨 150040) 摘 要:中国经济在快速发展的同时，造成了严重的环境污染。由于环境自身对污染具有一定的消化能 力，污染企业容易存在侥幸心理而不对自己的排污物进行积极处理。在政府与企业的环境保护博弈中， 由于政府不了解企业是否进行积极排污而处于信息劣势。这种信息不对称，造成政府监管与治理的困 难。本文就是基于这样的假设条件，通过建立政府与企业的动态贝叶斯博弈模型来分析政府和企业的 行为。研究发现，虽然政府不具备信息优势，但依旧可以通过控制惩罚力度、监管成本等变量使其在博 弈中占据主导地位。 关键词:环境污染;监管力度;精炼贝叶斯均衡 DOI: 10. 16315/j. stm. 2015. 06. 002 申图分类号: F062.1 文献标志码:A Supervision and management of the environment pollution in China based on Bayesian Game ZHANG Yun-hui , SA Ru-la (School of Economics , Harbin University of Science and Technology , Harbin 150040 , China) Abstract: With the rapid development in China s economy , severe environmental pollution has been caused. Ow- ing to the ability of the environment to digest its pollution , polluting enterprises doesn t conduct active sewage treatment easily. In the game of environmental pollution , the govemment doesn t know whether companies is active or not , and has informational disadvantage. This kind of information asymmetηcauses problems for the govemment supervision and management. This article analyzes the behavior of govemments and enterprises through the estab- lishment of the dynamic Bayesian Game model based on these assumptions. The study found that although the gov- emment does not have information advantages , it can still make its dominance in the game by penalties , regulatOIγ costs and other contr