基于非对称信息的企业经理人股权激励的博弈分析.pdfVIP

第 28 卷第3 期 天津工业大学学报 Vo1.28 No.3 JOURNAL OF TIANJIN POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY 2∞9 年 6 月 June 2侃 慕于非对称倍息的企业经理人股权激励的博弈分析 潘永明，米冠旭 (天津理工大学管理学院，天津 3∞384) 摘 慕:运用傅森论、信息经济学的.1.本原搜对企.:1l经理人的股权激励机制进行了分析，探讨了企业产 ili 与经理人 的努力水平之间的关系，对所有者授予的经理人的股权数量、经理人的努力水平以及影响股权激励机制的 外部不确定性因素进行了研究，并在信息不对称基础上引入股权激励的监督机制，分析了所有者和级级人 各自的收益函数，得出所有者监督的最优概熟和经理人努力的最优概幕，并认为所有者的监督效牟对股权 激励机制的有效执行有重要意义. 关键词:经理人;股权激励;博4平:努力水平 中圄分类号: F224.32 文献标识码:A 文章编号: 1671-Q24X(2009)03-OO80-05 Game analysis of corporate manager s equity incentive based on asymmetric information PAN Yong-ming , MI Guan-xu (Sch，∞1 of Management. Tianjin University ofTechnology. Tianjin 300384. China) Abstract: 四e coφorate manager s equity incentive mechani自m was 缸mlyzed by using the basic tenets of game theory. information e吧。nomics. ηle relationship between the enterprise outputs 刷d 由e mana喜衍自 effort level is research时. and 由e manager s awarded number of share酶，由em刷a事:er s efforts level and the external uncertainty factors which influenc暗 the equity incentÍve mechanism are anal归ed. The equíty íncentive superviωry mechanism is íntroduced based onωymmetric information , and of their respective income function of owners and managers is analyzed. the optimal probability of owner obtained and m朋agers is obtained. It is painted out that 由e efficiency of the supervisions have great si伊lificance to the implementation of incentive mech酬isms. Key words: m阳ager; 叫uity íncent