壳资源交易中信号传递博弈模型.pdfVIP

第 39 卷增刊 天津大学学报 Vol. 39 Suppl. 2∞6 年6 月 Journal of Tianjin U时versity Jun. 20俑 Signaling Game Model in the Exchange of Shell Resources TAN Qi咱-mei , ZHAO Li.卜.幽吁咄-吁.r咄叩min (School of Ma阳na目鸣哥emen时lt ， Tianjin University , Tianjin 3仪则72 ， China) Abstract: Focusing on the asymmetric information in the exchange of shell resources , by applying the method翩 。logies of incomplete information dynamic games and information economics , a signaling game model between the purchaser and the bargainer of shell resources is given , and the separating 叫uilibrium ， pooling equilibrium and semi-separating equilibrium are discussed. The study shows that when the purchaser bid different prices , there are different Bayesian equilibriums. Keywords : shell resources; asymmetric information; 自ignaling game j perfect Bayesian equilibrium Article ID: 0493帽 2137(2∞6) Suppl- 0413- 05 斑资源交易中倍号传递博算模型 谭庆美，赵黎明 (天津大学管理学院，天津 3则72) 摘 要:根据壳资源交易中的信息不对称现象，结合不完全信息动态博弈a信息经济学的有关理论，建立了壳资 源交易双方的信号伶逃博弈模型，并进行了分离均衡、准分离均衡、混同均衡分析.分析结果农明，先资源买方接受 的价格不同时，壳资源交易双方存在不同的贝叶斯均衡. 关键词: 1笔资源;不对称倍息;倍号传递博弈;精炼贝叶斯均衡 ln China , the listed company with bad achievement , purchaser does not. The asymmetric information puts the small operation scale , and high asset-debt ratio is cal1ed purchaser under a serious disadvantage in the exchange of shell company [1-3]. In order to resolve