供大于求时关键字广告位拍卖保留价设计探究.docVIP

供大于求时关键字广告位拍卖保留价设计探究摘 要：在关键字广告位拍卖定价中，由于一个关键字对应广告位的数量没有限制，常出现供大于求的局面，在此背景下本文建立模型并分析了考虑CTR(Click Through Rate)时设置不同保留价对投标者的投标策略与拍卖收益的影响作用。研究发现供大于求时设置保留价对高类型投标者投标激励效果比较明显，且较高水平的保留价会导致低类型投标者投标与保留价呈反向变化。当设置保留价水平较低时，拍卖一个广告位比两个广告位收益更高，当设置保留价水平较高时，拍卖两个广告位收益大于等于拍卖一个广告位的收益。研究结论不仅对企业保留价设计提供科学决策依据，也推进了拍卖理论中保留价的设计研究。 关键词：关键字广告位定价;拍卖;保留价 中图分类号：F224 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1003-5192(2011)02-0040-06 Design the Reserve Price for Non-scarce AdWords Auction ZHANG E1, ZHENG Fei-feng2, LIU Ya-xu3, WANG Ying-luo2 (1.School of Information Management and Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, 200433, China; 2.School of Management, Xi?an Jiaotong University, Xi?an 710049, China; 3.School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China） Abstract:Auction is a traditional and efficient mechanism in rare resource allocation, and it is a new strategy for Internet Search Engine providers to price their AdWords as well. However, the number of AdWords places can be infinte related to an AdWords due to Internet technology. As a result, supply often exceeds demand. It is a usual phenomenon that only 1or 2 bidders participate in goole or baidu AdWords auction. This paper will analyze how to design the auction paremeter such as reserve price and ad?s amount in order to maximize the auctioneer?s revenue. We compare double ad auction with unit auction in existing literature under the same reserve price settings. It is shown that the reserve price stimulates high type bidder to bid more aggressively. However, it hinders low type bidder?s bid decreasing till zero as the reserve price increases despite the low reserve price stimulates him to bid higher. Moreover, the auctioneer?s optimal strategy is to auction two ads with higher reserve price or auction one ads when set low reserve price. Our result can help Internet Service Providers make better decision when the demand of adwords is sparse. Key words:AdWords pricing; auction; reserve price