基于发包方参与的软件服务外包委托-代理关系分析.pdfVIP

.辑学}2013 年6 月·第 27 卷·第 6 期(总第 162 期) 画同IJII士虫草 基于发包方参与的软件服务 外包委托-代理关系分析 李晓青 (厦门理工学院，福建厦门 361024 ) 摘要:针对不对称信息下软件服务外包中的道德风险问题，建立发包方参与的委托代理模型，求解发包方参与水 平、报酬激励系数和承包方努力水平最优解，进一步剖析发包方参与戚本系数、承包方能力系数、努力戚本系数、风 险规避程度、外生随机变量影响系数和不确定性对这三个变量的影响，同时考察了三者之间的逻辑关系，设计与发 包方参与相匹配的报酬激励机制，为发包方在软件服务外包中的参与决策和激励机制设计提供理论支持。 关键词:软件服务外包;委托-代理关系;道德风险;发包方参与;激励机制 中图分类号:F270.7 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1∞1 - 8409(2013)06 -0135 -05 Principal-agent Analysis of Software Service Ou恼。urcing Based on Contract-issuing Party Participation U Xiao-qing (Xiamen University of Technology ,Xiamen 361024) Abstract;ηlis paper , according to the moral hazard problem due to the asymmetric information in software service outsourc- ing , establishes principal-agent model with contract-issuing party participation , solves the optimal solutions of the contract- issuing party participation degree , reward incentive coefficient and the contractor effect , and further analyzes the impact of contract-issuing party participation cost coefficient , the contractor ability coefficient , effort cost coefficier此，也e degree of risk aversion , exogenous stochastic variable influence coefficient 皿d uncertainty on the three variables , whose logical rela- tionships are explored at 由e same time in the study. It put forward the incentive mechanism which rnatches contract-issuing party participation degree and provides a theoretical support for contract-issuing party participation decision making and in- centive mechanism desi伊· Key words; software 回rvice outsourcing; principle