指称、意向性和纯意向对象!.pdfVIP

StudiesinLogic,Vol.10,No.1(2017):128–149 PII:1674-3202(2017)-01-0128-22 Reference,Intentionality,andPurely IntentionalObjects OlavAsheim Department of Philosophy,UniversityofOslo Departmentof Philosophy,NanjingUniversity olav.asheim@ifikk.uio.no Abstract. Therearetwobigobstaclestomakingsenseofquantificationintobeliefandother propositional attitude contexts: one that the object referred to may not exist, the other that the principleofsubstitutivityofco-referentialtermsbreaksdowninsuchcontexts. Ishallarguein this paper that the first problem can be solved by recognizing objects of belief as entities that canbereferredtoregardlessofwhethertheyexist,andIshallsketchatheoryofexistentialsthat makesthisplausible. InadditionIshallarguethatdemonstrativereferenceisnotinitselfdirect reference, and I shall argue that there is no problem of substitutivity when the co-referential termsinquestionarebothuseddirectlyreferentially. 1 Introduction The ideas I am about to present in this paper come from an origin long ago. I startedtothinkalongtheselineswhenIwasworkingonmymasterthesis,whichhad asitstopicQuine’sphilosophyoflanguageandmind. Thatwasin1968. Iexpressed my thoughts in a more mature form in my doctoral dissertation Reference and Inten- tionality, which was published as a book by Solum Forlag in 1992.1 The book has later been translated to Chinese, and was published by Nanjing University Press in 2014. My ideas are a reaction to the problems that arise when we try to make sense ofquantificationintobeliefandotherattitudecontexts,andmeanttobeasolutionto them. Part of my solution, and the most important part, is to recognizepurely inten- tionalobjects —objectsthatcanbeidentifiedonlybytheirintentionalproperties,by what pe