政府持股事业之公司治理与绩效关联性研究.DOC

第一篇：政府持股事業公司治理與績效關聯性研究即所謂的「代理問題」（principal-agent problem）而公司治理（Corporate Governance）的概念，係在所有權與經營權分離後建立一個解決代理問題的機制。經營效率與社會福祉公益間產生矛盾的情形。 本研究以政府持股5％以上企業共48家為主要研究對象，另依照產業別、營業規模、員工人數等標準，以等比例的方式挑選出非政府持股事業作為對照組，共96家研究樣本。次級資料蒐集之來源為證券基金會與台灣經濟新報資料庫，資料時間為2000至02年。資料經整理及比對後，進行共變數分析（ANCOVA），獲得研究結果如下： 一、若『曾為公營事業』、『董事會多元化程度愈高』、『董事會持股愈高』等前提之一成立下，公股介入越深（持股比例愈高或公股獲得額外控制權愈多），則可形成公司治理之有效組合，產生提升績效或抑制多角化程度之監督效果。在此一組合下，意味公股應爭取加碼投資，或積極爭取董事席次，以產生更有效的監督力量。 二、若『非公營事業』、『董事會多元化程度愈低』、『董事會持股愈低』等前提之一成立之下，公股介入越深（持股比例愈高或公股獲得額外控制權愈多），則會形成公司治理之無效組合，導致績效下降或多角化程度增加之結果。在此一組合下，意味著公股應該朝向撤資之方向思考，以使政府資金能做更有效的運用。 ABSTRACT In the prior research on corporate governance, the publicly listed companies in the advanced countries are mainly the target for empirical studies. The enterprises with state-owned shareholdings are rarely being explored for the effect of state ownership on performance, corporate value or strategic behavior. From the perspectives of government behavior and corporate governance, privatization has been adopted by many countries worldwide as an effective way to tackle the inefficiency problems inherently existed in the SOEs. However, business scandals have occasionally happened to those privatized enterprises with residual state shareholdings. This study is aimed to examine the role of state ownership in the privately run enterprises from the perspective of corporate governance. Forth-eight publicly listed companies with more than 5% state-owned shareholdings are selected as the sample, another batch of 48 enterprises (without state-owned shareholdings) are also selected as the counterfactual. The ANCOVA models are established to examine the direct effects of state-owned shareholdings, of board composition, and the interaction effects of both. The results show that Given one of the conditions (the status of former SOE, high board diversity, and high insiders ownership), the higher government involvement in terms of shareholdings or additional control power (board seats), the stronger the case