职务发明中的道德风险及规制比较.ppt

职务发明中的道德风险及规制比较 Moral Risks in Service Inventions and A Comparative Study of the Regulatory Systems 向波 Xiang Bo 南开大学法学院 Nankai University Law School 一、职务发明中的道德风险 I. Moral Risks In Service Inventions 与产品生产相比较，职务发明具有以下特点： When Compared with product manufacturing, a service invention is characterised by the following: 1.结果的不确定性。技术研发是一项充满不确定性的活动，随机事件的发生导致很难预计最终的结果。 1. Uncertainty in the final results. Technical development is an activity of uncertainties, the final result of which are hardly predictable due to the various random factors in the process. 2. 技术发明市场价值的不确定性。物质产品可参照同类产品或者替代产品的价格确定其市场价值，而技术发明则难以准确评估其市场价值。 2. Uncertainty in the invention’s market value. While in manufacturing, the market value of the product could be inferred on basis of similar goods or substitutes in the market, it is very difficult to accurately predict the value of technical inventions. 3.技术研发活动的不可监督性。产品生产可从生产过程、产品的数量和质量等多个维度来监督生产活动，并提供相应的激励。由于技术发明的特性，雇主无法从以上角度对技术研发加以有效监督。 3. Impossibility of supervision of the development activity. In manufacturing, the activity may be monitored and incentivized in terms of process, product quantity and quality, as well as other dimensions. By contrast, an employee could hardly run effective supervision in the above aspects due to the characteristics of technical inventions. 基于技术研发活动的上述特点，在雇主与受雇的发明人之间存在更为严重的信息不对称问题。从委托—代理模型来看，由于职务发明活动的不可监督性，在职务发明中会诱发更多的道德风险： The above characteristics of technical development result in a substantial information asymmetry between the employer and the employee inventor. From the perspective of the principal-agent model, the impossibility of supervision of service inventions would lead to more moral risks: 1.懒惰或懈怠 1. Laziness or sluggishness; 2.抄袭与作假 2. Plagiary and cheating; 3.隐瞒与侵占 3. Concealment and embezzlement. 由于与职务发明相关的道德风险行为更为多样化，这就为雇主监督科研人员的行为带来了更多的问题。这就需要对发明人提供激励以消除或减轻道德风险问题。 The diversity of moral risks in relation to service inventions brings more difficulties to the supervision by the employer of the RD staff. A