Constraints in Repeated Games - University of Pennsylvania在重复博弈的约束-宾夕法尼亚大学.pptVIP

Constraints in Repeated Games * Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium …so what is rational learning? Kalai Lehrer, 1993 Rational learning is… Bayesian Updating frequentist vs. Bayesian statistics What is Rational Learning? frequentist vs. Bayesian statistics Frequentist Approach Assume a coin 10 times and it comes up heads 8 times A frequentist approach would conclude that the coin comes up heads 80% of the time Using the relative frequency as a probability estimate, we can calculate the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) Frequentist MLE not always accurate in all contexts For ?m the model asserting P(head) = m, and s an observed sequence, the MLE is: arg maxm P(s|?m) Bayesian Approach Allows us to incorporate prior beliefs e.g., that our coin is fair (why not?) We can measure degrees of belief, which can be updated in the face of evidence using Bayes’ theorem P(?m |s) = (P(s|?m) * P(?m))/P(s) We already have P(s|?m), we can quantify P(?m) and ignore the normalization factor P(s) Arg maxm P(?m |s) = .75 for P(?m) = 6m(1-m) Under What Conditions? Infinitely repeated game subjective beliefs about others are compatible with true strategies Players know their own payoff matrices Players choose strategies to maximize their expected utility Perfectly monitored Discounted payoffs …must eventually play according to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game What Isn’t Needed assumptions about the rationality of other players knowledge of the payoff matrices of other players Definitions A game is perfectly monitored if all players have access to the complete history of the game up to the point where they are currently at. discounting introduces a factor that future payoffs are multiplied by: ui(f) = (1 - ?i) ∑t = 0∞ Ef(xit+1) ?it note the relation to geometric series …continued beliefs are compatible with true strategies if the distribution over infinite play paths induced by the belief is absolutely continuous with respect to