具有负外部性的双边市场.pdfVIP

具有负外部性的双边市场 摘 要 本文构建了一个具有负外部性的双边市场模型，考察了由消费者和广告资助的媒体企业间的双 寡头垄断竞争问题。研究表明，媒体企业的替代性越强，则对消费者收取的价格越低，到媒体访问 的消费者越多，广告水平和广告价格也越高，然而这种行为却减少了媒体的利润。媒体之间竞争的 加剧导致媒体企业的收入来源从消费者向广告的转移，而主要由广告资助的媒体企业拥有较多的消 费者。应用该模型分析媒体与广告商组成垂直联盟的激励问题，结果表明，当媒体差异化程度较大 时，媒体都组建自己的垂直联盟是纳什均衡。然而，如果媒体是密切的替代品，可能得到只有一个 垂直联盟的非对称均衡。 关键词：负外部性 双边市场 媒体企业 垂直联盟 Two-sided Market with Negative Externality Abstract This paper develops a model of two-sided market with negative externality, to study the duopoly competition between two media firms that are both advertising-financed and consumer-financed, which provides with us an insight of describing functional mechanism, effect of differentiated strategies and equilibrium market structure. It is shown that equilibrium prices of consumer are lower, amounts of consumer visiting media higher, and the prices and amounts of advertising higher, the less differentiated the media are perceived to be, even though these behaviors reduce their profit. In addition, an increase in media competition results in a shift from consumer payments to advertising as source of media’s revenue, and media firms that are mainly advertising financed have relatively large consumers. Applying this model to analyze the incentives of media firms to form vertical alliance with their advertiser, we find that both media firms forming their alliance is a Nash Equilibrium outcome when they are more differentiated. However, when they are closer substitutes, we may obtain the asymmetry equilibrium with only one vertical alliance. Key Words: Negative Externality; Two-sided Market; Media Firms; Vertical Alliance 具有负外部性的双边市场