

Brazil and the nuclear issues in the years of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government (2003-2010)

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Introduction

Since the Brazilian participation in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, Brazilian foreign policy has given special consideration to nuclear issues. In the last sixty years, with democratic and military governments, one of the country's goals was the development of an autonomous nuclear industry through the acquisition of technology for enriching the uranium found in the country. Brazil was a persistent opponent of the unequal non-proliferation agreement that divided the world into two groups of countries – those with and those without a nuclear military capability, and which reflected the order established by the two Cold War superpowers. The end of the bipolar system marked an important change in the Brazilian attitude.

With the process of democratization and the change in the international system, Brazil gradually adhered to the regimes of nuclear non-proliferation, eventually signing the Non-Treaty in 1998, and becoming one of the most significant supporters of global disarmament and denuclearization.

During the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), the nuclear questions continued to have crucial importance for an emerging country such as Brazil. Brazilian diplomacy in fact had played a prominent role in the international negotiations involving atomic issues. Indeed Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry for Foreign Affairs) participated not only in the initiatives for strengthening the NPT, with the 2005 and 2010 review conferences, but recently brokered a nuclear deal between the nuclear weapon states (NWS), as well trying to revive the talks with Iran, which has been accused of developing a clandestine nuclear military program.

Thus nuclear diplomacy has represented a fundamental part of President Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva's strategy to make Brazil a central player in the

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international system, in addition to the long-standing ambition of obtaining a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Functioning as a *bridge* between the North and the South of the world, Brazil has maintained cordial relations with Washington, both under the George W. Bush and the Barack Obama administrations, even if the Brazilian President and his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim expressed national autonomy in terms of US actions. Furthermore the President has implemented forms of strong South-South cooperation through new forums search as the BRIC countries (Brazil-Russia-India-China), the IBS countries (India-Brazil-South Africa) and other instruments of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the global and regional context.

The object of the present article is to analyze the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's position on nuclear issues through the analysis of the major actions of Brazilian diplomacy during the last eight years and the implementation of a national nuclear program.

Aspects of continuity in the Brazilian nuclear diplomacy from Cardoso to da Silva

In the years before his election the President expressed a strong criticism of ex-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's decision of adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As Presidential candidate of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT – Workers' Party) in 1998 and 2002 Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva considered that policy to represent adhesion to an alignment with the United States and with an unequal international order represented by the treaty¹. The action that the current President has taken during his administration has, however, revealed a substantial weakness in those statements that represented more electoral rhetoric than an actual plan for his international agenda, even if prominent members of his cabinet and in Brazilian diplomacy released controversial declarations.

In fact the Minister of Science and Technology, Roberto Amaral, resigned in 2004 after implying that Brazil should not forgo the possibility of obtaining nuclear weapon technology². Some years later, in 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Relations issued a note in order to deny any possible withdrawal from the NPT after the presumed statement of Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, then Secretary-General of Itamaraty, about the future permanence of Brazil within the international agreement³. Finally, recent personal declarations of the Vice-

1 Considered particularly controversial was Lula's speech before a military audience in 2002 when he underlined the Brazilian acceptance of an unfair international order. See Hall, Kevin G. (2002). "Leftist Lula would shift Brazil's tack with U.S.: Presidential candidate warms to Cuba. Mass support comes from citizens who feel jilted by a decade of Washington-style economics". *The Montreal Gazette*

2 In CDI (May 2004), "Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions", Available at The Center for Defense Information [http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2200].

3 See Ministério das Relações Exteriores (November 2006). *Posição do Brasil sobre Desarmamento e Não Proliferação Nuclear*, Note No. 625, Available at Sala de Imprensa do MRE [www.mre.gov.br].

President of Brazil, José Alencar, about the necessity of having an atomic bomb in order to join the club of the great powers caused much international controversy that forced the Government to distance itself from Alencar's position⁴. Notwithstanding these personal positions the President has confirmed the Brazilian commitment to the idea of nuclear non-proliferation.

After a long process following the end of the Cold War and the establishment of a mutual trust with Argentina, Brazil adhered to the main international nuclear non-proliferation agreements. Between 1991 and 1994 Brazil created a bilateral nuclear non-proliferation agreement with Argentina through the creation of a bi-national agency for accounting for and controlling nuclear materials (ABACC-Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares). It became a model for other regions and the 1994 IAEA-ABACC-Argentina-Brazil agreement imposed inspections and a full system of safeguards on every nuclear activity in both countries. It created an regime equivalent to the NPT for the two countries in a period when they still opposed the global treaty.

The move toward inclusion in international agreements continued in 1994 when Brazil became a full member of the Latin American Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, modifying the reservations posed in 1967 to its participation. Brazil reiterated its formal renunciation to its right to cause peaceful nuclear explosions and above all implemented the Tlatelolco agreement⁵.

Brazil was the last major country to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), when it ratified the treaty in 1998. This marked the end of the so-called “*golden decade*” of the NPT that began in 1986 with the US-USSR Reykjavik agreements and ended in 1998 with the Brazilian decision⁶. In those twelve years many nuclear powers became parties to the treaty or adhered to it, renouncing all nuclear ambitions. France and China, the other two official NWS (Nuclear Weapon States) recognized by the NPT, entered the agreement in 1991 and 1992, respectively. The end of the Cold War and the removal of any nuclear external threat, along with the process of full democratization, led South

4 On the latest declaration by Alencar on the nuclear weapons see Sibaja, Marco (September 25, 2009) *José Alencar, Brazil VP, says country should build nuclear arms*. Available at Huffington Post at [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/25/jose-alencar-brazil-vp-sa_n_300187.html] and Monteiro, Tânia (April 14, 2010). “Bomba iraniana pode ser para defesa” diz Alencar”. *Estado de São Paulo*. Nelson Jobim, current Brazilian Minister of Defense took a different position from the Vice-President stating that Brazil opposes any kind of nuclear proliferation, above all in the Middle East. (April 14 2010), “Jobim discorda de Alencar e contesta arma nuclear no Irã”. *Estado de São Paulo*.

5 Brazil announced the change to its traditional defense of the right to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) in September 1990 at the UN General Assembly. It is important to consider that in the same year the great superpowers agreed to suspend their PNEs indefinitely. On the Brazilian position in 1990 see Caixeta Arraes, Virgílio [2005]. “O Brasil e o Conselho de Segurança da Organização das Nações Unidas: dos anos 90 a 2002”. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 48 (2): 152-168. The Brazilian negotiator for full membership of the Tlatelolco Treaty was Ambassador José Viegas Filho. Interview with the author, Rome: February 10, 2010.

6 At the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik the leaders of the two superpowers agreed informally to reduce substantially their nuclear arsenals revitalizing the talks on global disarmament interrupted in 1979. See Fisher, Beth A. (2010). “US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush”. *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol 3., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 288.

Africa, with an undeclared military nuclear program, to dismantle its military arsenal and join the NPT in 1993⁷. President Menem of Argentina, took a similar decision in 1995 some months before the beginning of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The decision to extend the treaty indefinitely, along with the US and Russian commitment toward general nuclear disarmament, created a situation that in 1995 relegated Brazil to a small club of opponents to the NPT whose main participants were India, Pakistan and Israel, countries with a nuclear military capability not recognized as atomic powers by the treaty.

Although its criticism concerning the unequal nature of the NPT remained valid, Brazil had to enter it because both of the changed international context and the growing international consensus around the treaty. As President Cardoso's Foreign Minister Lampreia stated, adherence to the treaty was a matter of concern for Brazil because it represented, in a period when a possible reform of the Security Council appeared close and Brazil was a possible candidate for permanent membership, a strong lack of international credibility for a democratic government. The decision taken by the couple Cardoso-Lampreia was shared by the majority of the Brazilian diplomacy. As a consequence, in 1997 the Brazilian Government signed the Treaty and ratified it in 1998.

The new Brazilian attitude towards non-proliferation appeared clear when the international regime was seriously threatened, that is to say when the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan took place in May 1998. Brazil joined a coalition of non-nuclear states from the North and the South of the planet calling for an end of Indian and Pakistani nuclear activities and for the full accordance with NPT objectives, such as renouncing nuclear weapons and the immediate adherence to the agreement. The NAC (New Agenda Coalition) composed predominantly of medium-sized powers, became the origin of many proposals for global denuclearization. The centrality of Brazil in that context was evident by its active participation in discussions about a world free from nuclear weapons, with a commitment that remained constant in the passage between the administrations of Presidents Cardoso and da Silva. Brazil, as an NAC member, was one of the main proponents of the 13-step grading progress toward nuclear disarmament. The proposal represented the core of the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and permitted the main nuclear powers to escape political deadlock.

Continuing President Cardoso's policy, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his new Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, maintained nuclear non-proliferation as a central goal of Brazilian foreign policy. In 2003, some days before the inauguration, Brasilia criticized the North Korean decision of withdrawing from the NPT and requested its immediate re-integration in the agreement⁸.

7 On the South African nuclear program see van Wyk, Martha (2010). "Sunset over Apartheid: United States-South African nuclear relations, 1981-93". *Cold War History*, 10:1, pp-51-79.

8 See Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Tratado para a Não-Proliferação Nuclear (TNP)*. Nota nº 14. January 12, 2003. [www.mre.gov.br]. (Accessed on February 15, 2010).

The necessary conservation of the agreement in all its aspects became a strong commitment on the part of Itamaraty and it was confirmed by the election of Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte as President of the 2005 NPT conference review. Despite Brazilian activism for reaching a consensus as had happened in 2000, and despite several months of preparatory works, the conference ended without a final document because of an impasse connected to North Korean and Iranian issues, and to the negative attitude of the United States and Russian governments towards effective disarmament⁹.

The efforts in this field of the da Silva administration were recognized in 2007 when the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced the appointment of Ambassador Duarte as the High Representative for Disarmament at the level of Under-Secretary-General. The second term of the Brazilian President's administration coincided with more incisive action on nuclear issues, as we will see later in the case of the Iran, with the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The goal of global disarmament represented another point of agreement between Cardoso's and da Silva's diplomatic action. Brazilian foreign policy was guided not only by Article 21 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which bans any nuclear weapon from the country, but above all by a demand from by the National Congress in 1998. At the moment of the NPT ratification the Brazilian congress expressed to the government a precise condition: the fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT that determines the obligation for the nuclear states to dismantle their nuclear arsenals. Although it could appear irrelevant to an understanding of the Brazilian foreign policy over the last 12 years, the demand by Congress represents a point of convergence between the different sides of the Brazilian political spectrum. If adherence to the NPT was a crucial question for the liberal elements in Brazilian politics, the need to overcome the inequalities between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) was the main matter of concern for a good part of the nationalist and leftist wing of the Parliament¹⁰.

In recent years both administrations in Brazil have taken a critical attitude towards the failed commitment of the United States of adhering to the CTBT

9 According to Wrobel the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed because of three factors. The first was the unilateralism promoted by the G.W. Bush administration that led a coalition of states to a war against Iraq because of the supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein's regime. The second reason was the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 after having announced its status as a country with nuclear weapons. It caused a three-year impasse in the negotiations in the Korean peninsula and saw the end of the diplomatic efforts conducted by the governments of Pyongyang, Seoul, Beijing, Washington, Tokyo and Moscow. The third factor was the Iranian nuclear program that was suspected of developing the clandestine construction of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the tension present in the Middle East did not allow, in 2005 or in 2010, the achievement of the goal of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in the area. On the 2005 NPT Review see Wrobel, Paulo (2005). "Falhanço inevitável ou oportunidade perdida?" *O Mundo em Português*. N° 29. August-September 2005. Available at IEEI.pt [<http://www.ieei.pt/publicacoes/artigo.php?artigo=14>].

10 The necessity of following the Congressional demand was recently brought to mind by Foreign Minister Amorim. In MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES [2010] Chanceler Amorim no Canal Livre. Available online at Sala de Imprensa – MRE [<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/videos/chanceler-amorim-no-canal-livre/?searchterm=nuclear>] (Accessed on May 20, 2010)

(Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). Even though it was strongly supported by Washington during the Clinton administration that signed it in 1996, the US Senate refused to ratify it in 1999 because of the perceived weakness of the agreement for non-nuclear proliferation after the 1998 Indo-Pakistani crisis. Brazilian disappointment, throughout the George W. Bush administration, was caused by the resumption of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the consequent lack of consensus between the United States and the Russian Federation concerning the signing of the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) III for a substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals.

If all the nuclear powers were criticized for the paralysis in their commitment to NPT article VI, a turning point can be considered, also from the Itamaraty perspective, as being President Obama's 2009 speech in Prague. The new American President demonstrated a substantial change of the US position in the nuclear field with a three-part strategy: a) to propose measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear arsenals; b) to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states; c) to prevent non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials¹¹.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his Foreign Minister welcomed the new American attitude, hoping for a positive development of this strategy. Although the Iranian and North Korean cases increased US disillusion, and despite strong internal opposition towards the full renunciation of the first nuclear strike capability and of nuclear weapons in general, a concrete step toward the Prague objectives was the signature of the new START in April 2010 between the two former superpowers. This treaty, after the difficulties of the Clinton and Bush administrations, marked the decisive resumption of the path towards the global nuclear disarmament¹². The new course of US nuclear policy has been generally supported by the current Brazilian administration. Notwithstanding some recent disagreements over the Iranian nuclear program, that will be discussed later, a cordial and frank dialogue has marked the US-Brazil relationship in the nuclear field.

Since 1996, however, a controversial point has characterized Brazilian participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although the 1994 Quadripartite Agreement imposes a full range of safeguards concerning nuclear activities, Brazil refuses to participate in an additional measure to the NPT, namely the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement. The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. One

11 For a full reference to the speech delivered by the US President Barack Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009 see [<http://prague.usembassy.gov/obama.html>](Accessed on May 20, 2010).

12 It is worth mentioning that the whole path toward global disarmament follows specific steps. After the agreement between Russia and the United States, the negotiations will be opened up to the rest of the states that own nuclear weapons for a broader agreement over the effective dismantling of the nuclear arsenals. This action is to be implemented along with the full admission of the unofficial nuclear states in the NPT after their renunciation of their atomic devices.

of its main aims is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites¹³. Intense negotiations for stricter safeguard measures took place between 1996 and 1998.

Even if the Brazilian opposition began during the Cardoso presidency, it became a matter of international concern during the years of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. A relevant part of the international community, especially the United States, insisted on including the Additional Protocol as a part of the NPT¹⁴. With an advanced nuclear program, the Brazilian position was deeply criticized in 2004 after the inauguration of the enriching uranium plant in the nuclear fuel factory of the INB (Brazilian Nuclear Industries) in Resende, in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Between March and November 2004 negotiations took place between the IAEA and Brazil about adjusting the international inspections to suit the need of preserving national technology. Through an agreement with the IAEA the Brazilian government agreed to protect the centrifuges from visual inspections using panels, without prejudicing the verification of the nuclear material. Notwithstanding this subsidiary agreement, the issue still remains central today in the IAEA-Brazil relations, not only with regard to activities related to the Resende plant, but also to the similar Navy plant in Aramar and the nuclear reactor plant developing a submarine engine¹⁵.

Besides the IAEA negotiations, the Brazilian refusal to adhere to the Additional Protocol was a source of tensions between the Bush administration and the Brazilian government. In June 2004 Brent Scowcroft, then chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, deeply Criticized The Brazilian Nuclear Program In An Article In *The Washington Post*¹⁶. Comparing

13 The need for more incisive inspections emerged when the IAEA discovered that Iraq, a signatory to the NPT and with a safeguard agreement with IAEA, had developed a clandestine nuclear program between 1981 and 1991. The goal of the program, initiated after the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi reactor in 1980, was to build atomic weapons. The revelations about this project shocked the international agency since the research buildings had been built near an official and declared research reactor.

14 It is important to underline that a growing number of States are ratifying the Additional Protocol. In 2003 Iran signed the Additional Protocol but did not ratify it. See Flemes, Daniel [2006]. "Brazil's Nuclear Policy From Technological Dependence to Civil Nuclear Power". Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. p. 7. Although the nuclear powers are not obliged to adhere to full range of safeguards, one of the last decisions of President G.W. Bush was to ratify the Additional Protocol on December 30, 2008. This decision may be considered a confidence-building measure by the US government. See "The US ratifies the IAEA Additional Protocol", (January 6, 2009). Available at Arms Control. [<http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3489>]. (Accessed on May 15, 2010). A total of 101 states have ratified additional protocols and another 29 have signed them. For details see the IAEA Web site at: [http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html]. (Accessed on May 18, 2010).

15 After his last visit to Brazil, on March 2010, the IAEA director Yukija Amano renewed his criticisms concerning the impossibility of inspecting the centrifuges. Nougayrède, Natalie (May 30, 2010), "Le programme nucléaire du Brésil suscite des doutes". *Le Monde*.

16 It is important to state that the State Department did not oppose the Brazilian nuclear program. There was a division within the former US administration. One faction constituted by the non-proliferation specialists, who elaborated the G.W. Bush nuclear doctrine, considered Brazil a threat to the nuclear agreement because

Brazil to Iran, in a period when the latter state had already ambitions in the area of uranium enrichment, he wrote: “acquiescing in the Brazilian enrichment program would have the effect of dividing nuclear power aspirants into good guys and bad”. In this context he did not see a legitimate ambition justified by the NPT and guaranteed by IAEA inspections, but a threat for the whole nuclear proliferation regime coming from an opponent to the Additional Protocol¹⁷. The Scowcroft position was confirmed during the works of the Independent Panel on a More Secure World and Strengthened United Nations, convoked in 2004 by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in order to strengthen the international organization on its 60th anniversary. As reported by the Brazilian delegate, Ambassador Baena Soares, Scowcroft proposed in the draft report of the panel a moratorium on the construction of enrichment facilities because of the risk connected to a possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. This proposal, opposed by Baena Soares in a letter to Annan, directly involved the Brazilian plant¹⁸. Although a report by the panel to the UN General Assembly was planned to be delivered in 2005, the idea of moratorium was softened and all the negotiations about non-proliferation failed after the unsuccessful 2005 NPT review¹⁹.

Any doubt on the part of the US government concerning the Brazilian position on the nuclear proliferation agreement was made definitively clear in a bilateral meeting between Celso Amorim and Secretary of State Colin Powell. In October 2004, during an official visit to Brazil, Powell stated: “Brazil is not a potential proliferator... In fact, it reportedly has agreed to allow the UN atomic watchdog agency to see parts of the centrifuges. Having renounced plans for nuclear weapons in 1990, Brazil wants to keep its reputation as a peace advocate²⁰”.

the Latin American country could represent a model for some ‘proliferating’ states such as Iran or North Korea. As a matter of fact, immediately after the Brazilian announcement of the inauguration of the Resende plant a State Department official called on Brazil to implement all IAEA safeguards at its nuclear plants and to adopt an additional protocol on non-proliferation. On the other side, the US position was modified by the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere when he told reporters: “We believe they (Brazil) are committed to meeting their international obligations and this is a matter that is best handled by the IAEA in a multilateral way. We do not want to make this a bilateral issue, because quite frankly the US has confidence that Brazil is a responsible actor. See US quite confident about Brazil’s intentions over nuclear technology”. *Agence France Presse – English version*. Wednesday April 14, 2004. (Accessed on May 15, 2010).

17 See Scowcroft, Brent (June 24, 2004), “A Critical Nuclear Moment”, *The Washington Post*, Thursday page A25. Available at *The Washington Post* website [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1027-2004Jun23.html>] (Accessed on May 13, 2010). It is interesting to notice the similarity between the US strategy to ‘freeze’ the Brazilian nuclear program in the 1970s, with the Carter administration, and under the G. W. Bush administration. In both cases the United States had the aim of establishing an international ‘bank’ for nuclear fuel under IAEA supervision limiting any national ambition of enriching uranium.

18 For the portuguese translation of the letter sent to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and to the IAEA Director Mohammed El Baradei see Baena Soares, João Clemente (2005), “Nossa responsabilidade comum”, in *Política Externa*, Vol. 14, N. 12, p. 52-54.

19 United Nations. (2005). In “Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General”. New York: United Nations, Dept. of Public Information.

20 On the Powell’s declaration see “Brazil’s Mantle of Leadership”. *Christian Science Monitor*, October 10, 2004.

Even if an open crisis between Brasília and Washington was avoided on subject of the Additional Protocol and its application to the Brazilian plants, the matter continued to represent an important issue at the nuclear non-proliferation discussions. A constant and growing number of signatories of this non-compulsory agreement are giving more credibility to this agreement. In a recent interview Minister Amorim, on the contrary, affirmed that the issue was not central to the reform of the NPT and underlined the Brazilian right to preserve its industrial secrets.²¹ In the future, however, it is possible that this position, which has remained the same since the years of the Cardoso presidency, might be modified in the face of stronger international pressure over the inclusion of the Additional Protocol in the Non-Proliferation Treaty²².

The central role of Celso Amorim

Despite all the ideological differences and the different ideas that have emerged in the Brazilian foreign policy, there is a central element that constantly marked Brazilian diplomacy: the presence of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. Amorim held this post between 1993 and 1995, during the Itamar Franco administration, was Brazilian permanent representative at the United Nations in New York in the Cardoso years, and played a central role in the whole process of insertion of Brazil in the nuclear non-proliferation agreements. It is worth recalling that he headed Itamaraty when the Tlatelolco treaty and the Quadripartite Agreement were implemented and ratified. In 1995 he was an observer of the quasi-universal consensus on the Non-Proliferation Treaty after the review and extension conference that took place in New York that year. He contributed to shaping Brazilian foreign policy in the form of renewing a strong position in relation to denuclearization and disarmament.

The work he has done from 1993 until 2010 can be compared to the Brazilian commitment to the independent foreign policy of the years that preceded the military dictatorship. This appears clear not only from the 1997 signature of the NPT, but above all by the Brazilian participation in a coalition of middle-level and neutral powers that, as in the 1960s, promoted the goal of full disarmament

21 For the declaration by the Brazilian foreign minister see Ministério das Relações Exteriores (March 2010) Chanceler Amorim no Canal Livre Available online at Sala da Imprensa do MRE [<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/videos/chanceler-amorim-no-canal-livre/?searchterm=nuclear>]. (Accessed on April 28, 2010).

22 The encouragement of the universalization of the Additional Protocol was one of the realistic outcomes expected by the 2010 NPT conference review. This goal was constantly underlined during the preceding meetings in preparation for the 2010 conference. See Chouby, Deepty (2009). "Restoring the NPT. Essential Steps for 2010". Washington DC, United States: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p.27. Joseph Nye, one of the main US experts on nuclear strategy and author of the concept of 'soft power', recently requested the immediate Brazilian adhesion to the IAEA Additional Protocol. See Simon, Roberto. "Brasil deve assinar o protocolo adicional do TNP". *Estado de São Paulo*. April 11, 2010. Furthermore the Brazilian debate was enriched before the conference by the positions expressed by Rubens Ricupero, former UN deputy secretary-General, and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães respectively in favor and in opposition to Brazilian adhesion to the Additional Protocol. *Folha de São Paulo*. April 10, 2010.

and denuclearization or carried out the role of negotiators in the nuclear crisis, as was the case of Brazil in Cuba in 1962²³.

The clearest evidence of this continuation and of the new course of the Brazilian policy may be identified in the Amorim's participation in the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Established as an independent commission in November 1995 by the Australian Government, led by the then Prime Minister John Keating, its report was issued in August 1996 and presented to the UNGA at the end of September. The *Canberra Report*, after having highlighted the main points of the nuclear debate, proposed the necessary steps to eliminate nuclear weapons²⁴. The Canberra Commission was composed of key actors of both governmental and non-governmental origin and became the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation discussions of the following years. Hence all the requests for disarmament from the middle-level powers relied on this report that, for the first time after the end of the Cold War, represented a new position, overcoming the traditional rivalry between the NWS and the NNWS. Former opponents to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as South Africa and Brazil, neither their traditional attitude in favour of proposing a new agenda. The importance of that experience, and the need for accomplishing the still unfulfilled Canberra goals, was recalled by Foreign Minister Amorim in February 2010 in Paris during the summit meeting of the 'Global Zero' organization²⁵. His action and, in general, the Brazilian attitude, continued to follow the pro-disarmament spirit that Amorim had showed during his participation in the UN meetings, in the Disarmament Commission, in the General Assembly, and above all in the Security Council where Brazil has had a seat several times during the last years.

The most relevant point to be considered was Amorim's action in promoting the success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Brazil, along with the other countries of the New Agenda Coalition, had a central role in elaborating the 13 steps toward nuclear disarmament that formed the core of the final declaration of

23 For an account of the Brazilian position during the Cuban missile crisis see Wrobel, Paulo. 1993. "Diplomacia Nuclear Brasileira: Não Proliferação e o Tratado de Tlatelolco". *Contexto Internacional*, Volume 15, Número 1, Janeiro-Julho 1993, and Hershberg J. G., "The United States, Brazil and the Cuban missile crisis, 1962 (Part 2)", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol.6 No.3, Summer 2004.

24 First of all the Report requested the nuclear weapon states' commitment to a nuclear weapon-free world and recommended the following immediate steps: Taking nuclear forces off alert; Removing warheads from delivery vehicles; Ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons; Ending nuclear testing; Initiating negotiations to further reduce US and Russian nuclear arsenals; Reaching an agreement among the nuclear weapon states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by Them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states. In addition to them the Report stressed the other measures that NWS had to prevent further horizontal proliferation. See Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (August 1996), "Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons". Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. p. 11-12.

25 In February 2010 during the Global Zero meeting Amorim recognized that the policy for abolishing nuclear weapons still relies on the Canberra Report. For Amorim's speech see "Palestra do Ministro Celso Amorim na Reunião de Cúpula da organização *Global Zero: a world without nuclear weapons*" – Paris, 2 de fevereiro de 2010 Available at Política Externa [<http://www.politicaexterna.com/archives/8481#axzz0n3kUDdjB>]. (Accessed on February 10, 2010).

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