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外文
原文
The Search for the Best Financial Performance Measure
Material Source: http://web. Author: Bacidore.Jeffrey M.
/ehost/pdfviewer Boquist. John A.
Milbourn.Todd T.
Thakor.Anjan V.
Refined economic value added (REVA) provides an analytical framework for evaluating operating performance measures in the context of shareholder value creation. Economic value added (EVA) performs quite well in terms of its correlation with shareholder value creation, but REVA is a theoretically superior measure for assessing whether a firms operating performance is adequate from the standpoint of compensating the firms financiers for the risk to their capital. In this article, comprehensive statistical analysis of both REVA and EVA is used to estimate their correlation with and their ability to predict shareholder value creation. REVA statistically outperforms EVA in this regard. Moreover, the realized returns for the 1988-92 period for the top 25 REVA firms were higher than the realized returns for the top 25 EVA firms.
In the 1980s, shareholder activism reached unprecedented levels and led to increased pressure on firms to maximize shareholder value consistently. For example, Time magazine summarized this activism as Angry investors closed out the Decade of Greed with demands that executive compensation should be tied to company performance (Smolowe 1996). The basic idea is that if managers are offered compensation contracts that are tied to shareholder wealth changes, their incentives will be better aligned with those of shareholders than is the case for other types of contracts. In designing such contracts, however, an important issue is which measure of shareholder performance to use in designing the contract.
The obvious metric for judging firm performance is the stock price itself (see, e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990 and Milbourn 1996). Stock price, however (or returns based on sto
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