法人刑法以及组织动机.pdfVIP

Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective Nuno GAROUPA Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain November 2000 Abstract Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the eco- nomic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individ- uals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. Keywords: law enforcement, corporation JEL classification: K4. Financial support by CICYT (grant SEC99-1191-C02-01) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply. Department d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Far- gas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. Email: nuno.garoupa@econ.upf.es; Phone: +34-93- 5422639; Fax: +34-93-5421746 1 1 Introduction In the United States, but generally not in Europe, firms are criminally liable for crimes committed by their employees within the scope of the firm and to its benefit. The nature of corporate crime comprises essentially fraud (usually against the government), environmental violations, and antitrust violations (Cohen, 1996). Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economics of enforcement. Are corpor