evolution of cooperation - csail - mit.docVIP

Towards Realistic Models for Evolution of Cooperation Lik Mui (lmui@lcs.mit.edu) Abstract Throughout evolution, human have exhibited cooperative behaviors which do not directly contribute to their individual survival. Activities such as warfare, caring for the young and sick, altruistic acts to the community, etc. contribute to the public good. This raises the question for why people regularly engage in these cooperative activities – many of which are costly to the individual. This paper summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of major approaches that have been taken to answer this question. Future directions for this future are suggested. Outline 1. Introduction 2 2. Existing Approaches to Study Evolution of Cooperation 4 3. Extending Existing Models 9 4. Conclusion 10 Appendix: Prisoner’s Dilemma 11 References 13  Introduction Darwin’s theory of evolution argues for the “survival of the fittest” but does not specify the unit for fitness measure. By “fittest”, one could mean the individual, the population, the gene, or the organization around a group of agents. Each interpretation calls for very different models for how natural selection works. Rational agency theory underpins most of modern economics (Kreps, 1990) and interprets “fittest” to refer to the individual. This individualistic view treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. Phenomena such as altruism and cooperation are dismissed as no more than disguises with selfish motivations (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Such interpretations are in contradiction with sociological and biological observations of human and animals (Trivers, 1971; Ostrom, 1998). Acts of giving and receiving permeate human life and the lives of many animals. However, the individualistic view of evolutionary theory predicts that reciprocally altruistic cooperation should be rare – natural selection should favor selfish behaviors. The beginning half of the past century saw the proponents of interpreting “fittest