HHL Working Paper No. 143 March 2015.pdfVIP

HHL Working Paper No. 143 March 2015 Scarcity, Competition, and Value a c André Casajus , Harald Wiese a PD Dr. André Casajus is a Research Fellow at the Chair of Economics and Information Systems at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Leipzig, Germany. Email: andre.casajus@hhl.de c Prof. Dr. Harald Wiese is a Professor of Microeconomics at the Institute for Theoretical Economics at the Faculty of Management Science and Economics at Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany. Abstract: We suggest a value for finite coalitional games with transferable utility that are enriched by non- negative weights for the players. In contrast to other weighted values, players stand for types of agents and weights are intended to represent the population sizes of these types. Therefore, weights do not only affect individual payoffs but also the joint payoff. Two principles guide the behavior of this value. Scarcity: The generation of worth is restricted by the scarcest type. Com- petition: Only scarce types are rewarded. We find that the types’ payoffs for this value coincide with the payoffs assigned by the Mertens value to their type populations in an associated infinite game. Scarcity, competition, and value AndrÈ Casajusa,b,, Harald Wiesec a Economics and Information Systems, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Jahnallee 59, 04109 Leipzig, Germany bLSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches Institut, Leipzig, Germany cInstitut f¸r Theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult‰t, Universit‰t Leipzig, Grimmaische Str. 12, 04109 Leipzig, Germany. Abstract We suggest a value for Önite coalitional games with transferable utility that are enriched by non-negative weights for the players. In