代理成本的形成与控制.docVIP

代理成本的形成与控制 摘 要:企业制度的两权分离，导致了企业的代理问题，如何实现企业经营者(代理人)与股东(委托人)利益一致，激励相容，是解决代理问题的关键。企业发展到一定程度一定规模在管理上就会出现复杂性，比如资本结构的多元化，所有者管理技能的有限性，此时由所有者直接进行管理的风险和成本都会加大。于是所有者寻求有效的代理人，分离出经营权成为委托人的角色。代理人和委托人在利益上存在的冲突产生了代理难题，而为此设计出监督、约束、激励和惩罚等措施都是有成本的，即代理成本。严格来讲，代理理论是金融学、经济学和财务学交叉研究成果之一。正是代理理论的出现使得我们对企业的内部构造的研究取得了突破性的进展。本文将以代理成本难题、代理成本的性质、其他类型的代理成本和代理成本的控制方法这四个方面来对代理成本进行综述。 关 键 字:代理成本形成;代理人;股东与债权人 The Forming of Agency Cost and It’s Control Abstract: The separation of two powers to the enterprise resulted the agency problem of enterprises. How to achieve common interests of enterprise managers (Agent, owner) and Shareholders (Principal), is the key to solve the agency problems. When enterprise run to certain degree there will be complexity in management, such as diversification of capital structure, because of the owners management skills has limitation, the risks and costs of directly management by owner will be increased. After that owners have to seek for efficient agents, separate management give to agents. The conflict in interests of enterprise managers and Shareholders cause the agency problems, and the methods which can solve the conflict like supervision, restraint, encouragement and punishment are all have costs, namely agency cost. In strictly, the principal-agent theory are one of the intersect research results by Finance and banking, economics and financial affairs. Just because the principal-agent theory appears let the internal structure of enterprises research become workable, and we have breakthrough progress. In this article, we use piecewise by way of explanation to analysis agency cost theory and form, and its practical significance. Key words: Agency cost; Agent; Shareholders and creditors 代理难题的形成 随着现代市场经济的产生和发展，企业规模逐渐扩大，经营一个企业对专业知识的要求越来越高，经营者所需要投入的精力也越来越多。初始的投资者将以更多的精力用来吸引新的投资者加盟本企业，将以更多的时间用在有关企业发展、壮大的战略思考上。此时，具有现代经营理念的所有者，将会选择聘请外部经理管理企业，而将自己从繁琐的日常经营中脱身出来。这种社会分工从总体上来说有利于效率的提高，并在一种良好的机制配合下，实现所有者和经营者双赢的结果。但这种分工即两权分离必然也会带来一定的负面效应，就是代理难题的出现。 这种企业所有者聘请外部经理管理