XEN存储安全文：XEN存储安全 分离设备驱动 数据加密.docVIP

XEN存储安全论文：XEN存储安全 分离设备驱动 数据加密 【中文摘要】近年来虚拟化技术得到蓬勃发展,开源软件XEN虚拟机利用半虚拟化技术,使虚拟机有接近单机的性能,又利用XEN虚拟机管理软件的超级权限实现对硬件的资源分配与管理,提高了虚拟机的安全性,这些优点都使得XEN虚拟机的应用前景广阔。XEN虚拟机采用分离设备驱动的机制,实现客户机对硬件资源的访问,客户机Domain U(非特权级客户机)访问自己的磁盘数据要通过Domain 0(特权级客户机)的磁盘块设备驱动程序完成。如果Domain U不希望Domain 0及其他客户机看到自身磁盘的数据,Domain U需要对磁盘做加密处理。此外,在读写磁盘数据的过程中,Domain U磁盘数据对Domain 0完全可见,Domain 0端的恶意程序可以窃听Domain U数据,造成Domain U磁盘数据的泄漏。本论文通过对XEN分离驱动机制进行详细分析,设计并实现了对磁盘(除文件系统元数据之外)数据的加密,这样可以使Domain 0能够正常挂载加密磁盘却无法查看磁盘数据。在Domain U前端驱动层加入数据加解密模块,利用AES算法对要写入Domain 0共享内存页面的数据进行加密操作,对读取的数据在Domain U地址空间进行解密,从而实现Domain U系统数据的安全存储。此系统不仅保证Domain U磁盘数据在静态的情况下对Domain 0不可见,同时也使Domain U读写磁盘数据的过程中,只要数据离开Domain U地址空间便处在加密状态,保证了数据在读写过程中的安全性。 【英文摘要】In recent years, virtualization technology is developing rapidly. The XEN VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor), an open source project, makes use of para-virtualization technology, which makes the guest OS have higher performance than the full-virtualization VMM. And it has the super privilege to manage and schedule the hardware resources, which improves the security of the guests. All of the advantages make the XEN have a promising future.XEN Virtual Machine adopts the split device driver model to implement the Domain’s access to the hardware resources. When the Domain U(Unprivileged Domain) accesses the disk data of its own, it has to hand over the task to the device driver in Domain 0(Privileged Domain). So if the Domain U doesn’t allow other Domains to see the data in its disks, the disks must be encrypted. Besides, if Domain 0 sniffs the processes of Domain U’s data access, it is very feasible, which will cause the Domain U’s data leak to Domain 0.In this paper, the split device driver model has been analyzed in detail, the Encrypting/Decrypting module is designed and implemented in the front end driver of Domain U. The disks attached into Domain U are encrypted fully except the metadata referring to the file system, which makes the Domain 0 mount the disk successfully but can’t view the data of fil