ID439-城房屋拆迁补偿的互动公平均衡评价及其实验研究20110115.docVIP

城市房屋拆迁补偿的互动公平均衡评价及其实验研究* 洪开荣 廖玉玲 （中南大学商学院 湖南长沙 410083） 摘 要：在城市房屋拆迁如何政府、开发商、被拆迁户等多方利益是当前城市化发展进程中一个十分理论问题。的分析，构建开发商的互动评价eciprocal Fairness Equilibrium Evaluation and Experimental Research of the Urban Housing Demolition Compensation kairong Hong1 yuling Liao2 (Business School, Central South University, Changsha,410083, China) Abstract: In the process of Urban housing demolition, how to coordinate the interests among government, developers, and removed homeowners is a very important theoretical issue in the process of the national urbanization. Based on the above background, this paper using the theory of reciprocity and fairness, conducted a systematic study on multilateral game problem in the process of urban housing demolition. On the analytical basis of inequity aversion model, we assumed government, developers and removed homeowners respectively reflect social value economic value compensation value of demolition project. This paper constructs the reciprocal fairness equilibrium evaluation model of value distribution among government and developers, developers and removed homeowners, government and removed homeowners, then it analyzes reciprocal fairness equilibrium between stakeholders. Finally, through designing a experimental research of reciprocal fairness equilibrium evaluation, it gives a analysis in-depth in the role of reciprocal fairness idea through using relevant data. Key?words: housing demolition; reciprocity; fairness; game equilibrium 1. 引言 在城市房屋拆迁过程中，人们在关注物质利益的同时Charness和Rabin（2000）以及Falk和Fischbacher（2006）。然而，这些模型相当复杂[]，他们依靠Geanakoplos、Pearce和Stacchetti1989）]。Rabin（1993）公平博弈模型中只适合两个参与者的博弈[]，而且，Charness和Rabin（2000）存在多重均衡，比其他模型多出很多自由参数。那么，社会偏好的简单模型，如Fehr和Schmidt（1999）的非公平规避模型，更能适用于各种类型的博弈模型。他们应用标准式博弈理论，拥有更少的估计参数，并且更能直观地得到一些定性和定量的预测分析[]。考虑到Fehr和Schmidt1999）的非公平规避模型简单易用性，本文将运用此模型来构建开发商的项目互动评价]。互动公平评价互动评价关注博弈主体之间相互最大化与相互最小化的互动公平行为，应当分析心理博弈的互动公平均衡及其价值。所谓非公平规避是指人们非公平结果，例如，他们愿意放弃一些物质利益来实现更为公平性的竞争结果。Fehr和Schmidt]。参考FehrSchmidt的分析模式，提出了确定特定项目互动公平均衡和相应的