商品契約稳定性研究.docVIP

PAGE PAGE 6 农业产业化经营中商品契约稳定性研究 赵西亮赵西亮，男，1976年4月，清华大学经管学院，在读博士生。专业：数量经济学　研究方向：契约理论与现代企业制度变革. 赵西亮，男，1976年4月，清华大学经管学院，在读博士生。 专业：数量经济学　研究方向：契约理论与现代企业制度变革. 通信地址：清华大学经管学院100084 电话(010E-mail:zxl01@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn 朱喜，男，1979年7月，清华大学经管学院，在读博士生。 专业：数量经济学　研究方向：计量经济学理论方法与应用。 （清华大学经济管理学院　北京　100084） 摘要 在法律不能完全强制契约执行的情况下，农产品市场价格波动越大，事后的履约率越低。由于经营规模少，拥有的财富少，农户对风险的态度非常规避，农户更看重当期的收入。所以，信誉对农户的价值很低，期望农户提高信誉是很难的。加强法律管制，提高契约强制执行力度，短期内可以增加履约率，长期内会造成“公司＋农户”契约市场的缩小乃至消失。在农业契约中，农户的专用性投资少，企业的专用性投资，特别是利他性专用投资的存在，增加了农户事后的机会主义行为，进一步降低了履约率。所以，有关增加专用性投资、提高农户信誉、加强法律管制的建议都不能增加农业契约的履约率。在农业契约稳定中，关键是风险分担机制。农户的高风险规避特征，决定了其机会主义的行为规则。农户的联合和企业的保险作用应该是解决农业契约履约率过低的基本方向。 关键词　资产专用性　机会主义　声誉　风险分担 Abstract When not all the agricultural contracts can be enforced, the more fluctuant the price of farm produce, the lower is the ex post implementation ratio of contracts. Because of small scale, poor, the farmers are much risk aversion. Therefore, they think much of present income. As a result, the value of reputation is small to farmers. Improving the reputation of farmers is not a favorable advice although it maybe someday when farmers are much richer. Enhancing the regulation of contracts enforcement and giving more supervision can increase the implementation ratio in short term, but when this is expected, few farmers will transact within contract. As a result, the contracts market withered. In agricultural contracts, farmers invest little specific-investment, but firms usually invest more specific-investment. Especially, the cooperative investments invested by firms before the contract is due increase the farmers ex post opportunistic behavior, which deteriorate the contract implementation. So, increasing the specific investment, improving the farmers reputation and enhance the law supervision are not desirable advice. Risk Sharing is critical to increase the implementation ratio in contracts. The coalition and cooperation of farmers and/or firms insurance in the relationship, perhaps