Efficiency and fairness of systemoptimal routing with user constraints. Networks. Forthcomi.pdf
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Efficiency and fairness of systemoptimal routing with user constraints. Networks. Forthcomi
Efficiency and Fairness of System-Optimal
Routing with User Constraints*
Andreas S. Schulz
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Office E53-361,
77 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, Uris Hall, Room 418,
3022 Broadway Ave., New York, New York 10027
We study the route-guidance system proposed by
Jahn, M?hring, Schulz, and Stier-Moses [Operations
Research 53 (2005), 600–616] from a theoretical per-
spective. As system-optimal guidance is known to be
problematic, this approach computes a traffic pattern
that minimizes the total travel time subject to user con-
straints. These constraints are designed to ensure that
routes suggested to users are not much longer than
shortest paths for the prevailing network conditions. To
calibrate the system, a certain measure—called normal
length—must be selected. We show that when this length
is defined as the travel time at equilibrium, the result-
ing traffic assignment is provably efficient and close to
fair. To measure efficiency, we compare the output to the
best solution without guidance and to user equilibria. To
measure unfairness, we compare travel times of differ-
ent users, and show that they do not differ too much.
Inefficient or unfair traffic assignments cause users to
travel too long or discourage people from accepting
the system; either consequence would jeopardize the
potential impact of a route-guidance system. ? 2006 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc. NETWORKS, Vol. 48(4), 223–234 2006
Keywords: selfish routing; price of anarchy; computational
game theory; multicommodity flows; route guidance; traffic assign-
ment
1. INTRODUCTION
Transportation authorities and users alike hope that route-
guidance systems can help to mitigate the congestion gen-
erated by the ever-increasing amount of vehicular traffic.
In particular, in-car navigation devices might be used not
Received August 2004; accepted June 2006
Correspo
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