Game Theory as an Instrument for the Analysis （博弈论作为分析的工具）.pdf

ARTICLE Game Theory as an Instrument for the Analysis of International Relations Hector Correa 1. Introduction International relations, as characterized, among other authors, by Evans and Newnham (1998, pp. 274n), Lake and Powell (1999, pp. 3n), Reynolds (1994, pp. 15n) and Wolfers (1991, pp. 31n) deals with the interactions among specific actors which include nation-states, international organizations, and multinational corporations. From this it follows that game theory, whose objective is the formalized analysis of relationships among two or more actors, can assist international relations theoreticians in explaining the interactions among the actors it considers, and practitioners in the field to influence those interactions to benefit the actors they represent or, hopefully, all humankind. In fact, as eloquently shown by Poundstone (1992), game theory and international relations have influenced each other almost since the publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), usually considered to be the first systematic and extensive formal analysis of social interactions. Bennett and Nicholson (1994, p. 209) indicate that this interaction has been both friendly and conflictive, and considered by some to be constructive and by others destructive. The object of this paper is to demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of game theory as an instrument for the study of international relations. The approach to be used describes elementary game theoretic models as an integral part of international relations, rather than as a collection of examples of the mathematics of game theory. A similar approach, but at a higher level of sophistication and with a more limited coverage, is used by Powell (1