JP_Morgan_case(摩根大通案例分析).pdf

9-309-001 J A N U A R Y 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 C L A Y T O N R O S E D A N I E L B . B E R G S T R E S S E R D A V I D L A N E The Tip of the Iceberg: JP Morgan Chase and Bear Stearns (A) There is one financial commandment that cannot be violated: Do not borrow short to invest long. — Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan Chase Co. CEO1 You wouldn’t know we’re a well-run bank if you attended a meeting here. We’re always asking, “What went wrong? What can go wrong? —Michael Cavanagh, JP Morgan Chase Co. CFO Bear Stearns Co. (Bear), the fifth-largest U.S. investment bank as 2008 began, burned through nearly all of its $18 billion in cash reserves during the week of March 10, 2008. Bear survived to the close of business on Friday, March 14 only because of that morning’s groundbreaking announcement: the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (N.Y. Fed), using JP Morgan Chase Co. (JPMC) as a conduit, would provide Bear with secured financing for a period of up to 28 days. Despite this unprecedented provision of liquidity support from the Federal Reserve System (Fed) to an investment bank, it was insufficient to reverse the decline in Bear’s condition, and on Friday evening, Bear CEO Alan Schwartz learned Bear’s access to the N.Y. Fed’s new lending facility would last but one day.2 N.Y. Fed President Timothy Geithner, Fed Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, and U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson were intent on limiting the impact of Bear’s problems on the wider financial sys