A Collusion-Resistant Routing Scheme for Noncooperative Wireless Ad Hoc Networks推荐.pdf

582 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL. 18, NO. 2, APRIL 2010 A Collusion-Resistant Routing Scheme for Noncooperative Wireless Ad Hoc Networks Sheng Zhong, Associate Member, IEEE, and Fan Wu, Member, IEEE Abstract— In wireless ad hoc networks, routing needs coopera- a VCG-based payment scheme [2] to stimulate intermediate tion of nodes. Since nodes often belong to different users, it is highly nodes to forward packets. Due to the property of VCG pay- important to provide incentives for them to cooperate. However, ment, an individual node cannot benefit from cheating in the most existing studies of the incentive-compatible routing problem focus on individual nodes’ incentives, assuming that no subset of routing protocol. However, when two or more nodes collabora- them would collude. Clearly, this assumption is not always valid. tively cheat, they can benefit from cheating. Hence, the result In this paper, we present a systematic study of collusion-resistant may be that some colluding nodes get more utilities while the routing in noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks. In particular, overall system performance degrades. Therefore, it is crucial to we consider two standard solution concepts for collusion resistance study how to achieve collusion resistance in incentive-compat- in game theory, namely Group Strategyproofness and Strong Nash Equilibrium. We show that achieving Group Strategyproofness is ible routing. impossible, while achieving Strong Nash Equilibrium is possible. An elegant result on collusion resistance was obtained by More specifically, we design a scheme that is guaranteed to con- Wang and Li in [33].