Regulatory Takings Substantially Advances Test Lingle v Chevron USA Inc实质进步测试.pdfVIP

2005] THE SUPREME COURT — LEADING CASES 297 tion. To avoid these costs, governments have an incentive to offer property owners more than market value. Finally, limitations on judicial competence counsel in favor of un- derenforcement. As Justice Kennedy put it, “a strong presumption of invalidity . . . would prohibit a large number of government takings that have the purpose and expected effect of conferring substantial benefits on the public at large.”83 For example, combating urban sprawl and inner-city decay depends on a locality’s ability to use emi- nent domain for economic development. Without that power, individ- ual holdouts can frustrate the locality’s effort to assemble the large parcel required for redevelopment.84 Developers will buy such parcels in the only place they can be found: the greenfields at a city’s edges. The federal courts are poorly positioned to anticipate or comprehend the potential impact of their decisions on America’s landscape.85 Such decisions are better made by local planning boards and town councils, which have relative accountability as well as relative expertise. In sum, the Court rightly chose to continue its “longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field”86 by underenforcing the Public Use Clause. The condemnation with which libertarian con- servatives have responded to Kelo — and their mobilization in legisla- tures across the country to overrule the Court by statute — vindicate the wisdom of the Court’s approach: apparently, the legislative process can be trusted to impose constr