why first language learning is not second language learning — wittgensteins rejection of st. augustines conception of learning资料.pdfVIP

WhyFirstLanguage LearningIs Not Second LanguageLearning WittgensteinsRejection of St. Augustines Conception of Learning CHRISTINA ERNELING York University AaSaatAcr: The PhilosophicalInvestigations starts with a quotation from St. Augustine on language learning. The usual reconstruction of Wittgensteins criticism of St. Augus- tines view on language focusses on meaning -- that is, the picture theory which he had in common with Wittgensteins own earlier views. This paper shows that Wittgenstein in discussing ostensive definition, understanding, and the private language argument also attacks St. Augustines notion of learning. In recent years the Augustinian conception has been resurrected in cognitive theories postulating an innate language of thought (e.g., Fodor), making Wittgensteins claims that this conception of learning is paradoxical very relevant. KEYWORDS:Wittgenstein, Augustine, Fodor, language, learning, language of thought, thinking, private language Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations starts with a criticism of St. Augus- tines account of language learning in terms of ostensive definitions. The usual reconstructions of Wittgensteins criticism of Augustines view of language focus on the implicit account of meaning - - that is, the picture theory which Wittgenstein took Augustine to have in common with his own earlier views in the Tractatus.1 Wittgenstein also provides an implicit criticism of the Augus- tinian account of learning which is expressed in the quote that begins this trea- rise. This conception of learning is not unique to Augustine, but is part, I think, of a deep-seated tradition in Western thinking and has recently been revived by Chomsky and even more so by J. Fodor in his book The Language of Thought (1979), and is uncritically accepted by many ps