Some Theoretical Concepts in Banking Principal-ag：一些理论概念在银行委托.pptVIP

下载本文档

1
0
约4.4千字
约 11页
2018-06-24 发布于四川
举报
版权申诉

Some Theoretical Concepts in Banking Principal-ag：一些理论概念在银行委托.ppt

1、本文档共11页，可阅读全部内容。
2、原创力文档（book118）网站文档一经付费（服务费），不意味着购买了该文档的版权，仅供个人/单位学习、研究之用，不得用于商业用途，未经授权，严禁复制、发行、汇编、翻译或者网络传播等，侵权必究。
3、本站所有内容均由合作方或网友上传，本站不对文档的完整性、权威性及其观点立场正确性做任何保证或承诺！文档内容仅供研究参考，付费前请自行鉴别。如您付费，意味着您自己接受本站规则且自行承担风险，本站不退款、不进行额外附加服务；查看《如何避免下载的几个坑》。如果您已付费下载过本站文档，您可以点击这里二次下载。
4、如文档侵犯商业秘密、侵犯著作权、侵犯人身权等，请点击“版权申诉”（推荐），也可以打举报电话：400-050-0827(电话支持时间：9:00-18:30)。
5、该文档为VIP文档，如果想要下载，成为VIP会员后，下载免费。
6、成为VIP后，下载本文档将扣除1次下载权益。下载后，不支持退款、换文档。如有疑问请联系我们。
7、成为VIP后，您将拥有八大权益，权益包括：VIP文档下载权益、阅读免打扰、文档格式转换、高级专利检索、专属身份标志、高级客服、多端互通、版权登记。
8、VIP文档为合作方或网友上传，每下载1次，网站将根据用户上传文档的质量评分、类型等，对文档贡献者给予高额补贴、流量扶持。如果你也想贡献VIP文档。上传文档

Some Theoretical Concepts in Banking Principal-ag：一些理论概念在银行委托

Topic 2: Theoretical Concepts in Banking Some Theoretical Concepts in Banking Principal-agent problem Adverse selection Moral hazard problem The implications of the above to: Relationship banking Arm’s length banking Why banks are like a firm or why they exhibit organisational structure? Banks are like firms. Coase (1937) explained that a firm need an organisational structure because some procedures are more efficiently performed by “command” i.e. assigning tasks to workers and coordinating the work, rather than reliance on market prices. A traditional bank with intermediary and liquidity function fits in well with Coase’s theory. Why banks are like a firm or why they exhibit organisational structure? Making loans and accepting deposits is an internal process – to do this, they need a command and control (CC) system in place. The intermediary role of banks and the CC system will lead to structures containing principals and agents to different extents. Principal-agent problem in banking Bank activities are usually collection of contracts b/w principal and agents. Whenever these contracts are not honoured properly, principal-agent problem will arise. This principal-agent problem may exists b/w shareholders of a bank (principal) and its management (agent), the bank (principal) and its officers (agents) and the bank (principal) and its debtors (agents), depositor (principal) and bank (agent) due to different priorities and incentives. Principal agent problem with debtors usually arise due to the fact that agent has more information about his/her characteristics than the principal. Adverse selection problem in banking The issue of adverse selection can lead to problems in banking because the principal has inferior information compared to the agent. This obviously has repercussions when it comes to forming agreements based on this information. It can also mean that the highest risk groups are the most likely to enter into the contract. Examples: Rip-off of cus