国际贸易理论以及政策.ppt

I. Tariff and Market Power TRADE POLICY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 1. Protecting a domestic single producer with increasing cost TRADE POLICY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 2. Tariff as a stimulant to exports 3. The non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas TRADE POLICY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 4. “Snatching” rent from a foreign monopoly TRADE POLICY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION II. Strategic Trade Policy in a Duopoly Setting TRADE POLICY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 1. A production subsidy in a common third-market TRADE POLICY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 2. A tariff in domestic market 3. Tariffs and export promotion (Krugman, 1984) Domestic and foreign firms both have decreasing costs. Under free trade, domestic and foreign firms supply their own markets and a third country market. Imposing import tariffs, domestic firm ‘s average costs will fall as its output expands, while foreign firm will rise, so that the domestic firm’s exports to the third country will also increase. TRADE POLICY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION TRADE POLICY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 4. Evaluation of strategic trade policy The nature of competition Retaliation Entry and exit Informational requirements CHAPTER 8 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION The preceding chapters suggest that a rational government who maximize the well-being of their country would pursue a policy of free trade. But even the most causal observer would note that free trade is the exception in the modern world, rather than the rule. In this chapter, we move from the normative analysis of what policies are “best” to a positive analysis of policy. In other words, in this chapter we will develop a theory of why countries impose the type of policies that they do, even if those policies are not optimal. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION I. Political Markets for Protection Demand for policies Supply of policies Political market Policies II. The Median Voter Model THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECT