纽约联储-监管破产银行（英）-2025.10.pdfVIP

NO.1168Supervising

OCTOBER2025FailingBanks

SergioCorreia|StephanLuck|EmilVerner

SupervisingFailingBanks

SergioCorreia,StephanLuck,andEmilVerner

FederalReserveBankofNewYorkStaffReports,no.1168

October2025

/10.59576/sr.1168

Abstract

Thispaperstudiestheroleofbankingsupervisioninanticipating,monitoring,anddiscipliningfailing

banks.Wedocumentthatsupervisorsanticipatemostbankfailureswithahighdegreeofaccuracy.

Supervisorsplayanimportantroleinrequiringtroubledbankstorecognizelosses,takingenforcement

actions,andultimatelyclosingfailingbanks.Toestablishcausality,weexploitexogenousvariationin

supervisorystrictnessduringtheGlobalFinancialCrisis.Strictersupervisionleadstomoreloss

recognition,reduceddividendpayouts,andanincreaseinthelikelihoodandspeedofclosure.Increased

strictnessentailsatrade-offbetweenalowerresolutioncosttotheFDICandreducedcredit.

JELclassification:G01,G21,N20,N24

Keywords:bankingsupervision,financialstability,financialregulation

_________________

Luck:FederalReserveBankofNewYork(email:stephan.luck@).Correia:FederalReserve

BankofRichmond(email:sergio.correia@).Verner:MITSloanSchoolofManagementand

NBER(email:everner@).TheauthorsthankRosalindBennett,MarkCarey,RobertClark,Harry

Cooperman,ThomasEisenbach,JoãoGranja,YadavGopalan(discussant),BevHirtle,KathrynJudge,

JoeMason,MattPlosser,BenRanish,FarzadSaidi,AmitSeru,andAdiSunderam,aswellasseminar

participantsattheFederalReserveBankofNewYork,BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserve,Foster

SchoolofBusinessatUniversityofWashington,SITEFinancialRegulation,YaleProgramonFinancial

Stability,andUMassAmherstforusefulcomments.TheythankNataliaFischl-LanzoniandTi