Cost Accounting-A Managerial Emphasis外文翻译.docVIP

原文 Material Source: Cost Accounting-A Managerial Emphasis Author: Charles T.Horngren、Srikant M.Datar和George Foster Intensity of Incentives and financial and Nonfinancial Measurements What affects the intensity of incentives? That is, how large should the incentive component of a manager’s compensation be relative to the salary component? To answer these questions, we need to understand how much the performance measure is affected by actions the manager takes to further the owner’s objectives. We illustrate this trade-off in the context of our Hospitality Inns example. Sally Fonda owns the Hospitality Inns chain of hotels. Roger Brett manages the Hospitality Inns San Francisco (HISF). Assume Fonda uses RI to measure performance. To improve RI, Fonda would like Brett to increase sales, control costs, provide prompt and courteous customer service, and reduce working capital. But even if Brett did all those things, high RI is not guaranteed. That’s because HISF’s RI is affected by many factors beyond Fonda’s and Brett’s control, such as a recession in the San Francisco economy or an earthquake that might negatively affect HISF. Or there could be other uncontrollable hotels, factors, such as road construction near compering positive effect on HISF’s RI. Uncontrollable factors make HISF’s profitability uncertain and , therefore, risky. As an entrepreneur, Fonda expects to bear risk. But Brett does not like being subject to risk. One way of “insuring “ Brett against risk is to pay Brett a flat salary, regardless of the actual amount of RI earned. All the risk would then be borne by Fonda. This arrangement creates a problem, however, because Brett’s effort is difficult to monitor. The absence of performance-based compensation means that Brett has no direct incentive to work harder or to undertake extra physical and mental effort beyond what is necessary to retain his job or uphold his own personal values. So, there must ask for preferred performance measures. Preferre