Myerson 1979 - Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem教程.pdfVIP

Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January, 1979) INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM BY ROGER B. MYERSON Collective choice problems are studied from the Bayesian viewpoint. It is shown that the set of expected utility allocations which are feasible with incentive-compatible mechanisms is compact and convex, and includes the equilibrium allocations for all other mechanisms. The generalized Nash solution proposed by Harsanyi and Selten is then applied to this set to define a bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problems. 1. INTRODUCTION IN THIS PAPER we will consider the problem of an arbitrator trying to select a collective choice for a group of individuals when he does not have complete information about their preferences and endowments. Not only does this arbitra- tor have to worry about settling fairly the conflicting desires of the groups diverse members, but he has to get them to tell him what their preferences are in the first place. Of course, he may ask his clients to tell him what he needs to know; but if he cannot compel truthful behavior then he must anticipate that some group members may lie to him in an attempt to manipulate his ultimate decision. Our goal in this paper will be to develop a unique solution to this arbitratorsproblem, based on Hurwiczs concept of incentive-compatibility [6] and Nashs bargaining solution [7]. Formally, we will describe the arbitrators problem by a Bayesian collective choice problem, an object of the form (1) (C, A1, A2, . . . , An, U1, U2, ...* Um,P), whose components are interpreted as follows. The individual members of the group, or players, are numbered 1, 2, ..., n. C is