互补性物品的最优拍卖机制_殷红.pdfVIP

2006 9 9 : 1000-6788( 2006) 09-0060-06 1 2 殷 红, 王先甲 ( 11 , 200062; 21 , 430072) : . Myerson , , , . , , , , , . : ; ; ; : F724159 : A Optim l Auction Mech nism for Complements 1 2 YIN Hong , WANG Xi n-ji ( 11 School of Business, E st Chin Norm l University, Sh ngh i 200062, Chin ; 21 Systems Engineering Institute of Wuh n University, Wuh n 430072, Chin ) Abstract: This p per studies the optim l uction mech nism for complements. B sed on the design ide of single- object uction of Myerson, this p per builds the model of designing uction mech nism for complements nd by solving the model g ins the optim l uction mech nism only for the c se of two objects. Then, simple numeric l ex mple is given to show the pplic tion of this mech nism in uction. Further, the optim l uction mech nism is comp red with sever l f mili r uction mech nisms. The results show th t the expected income of the seller is highest nd the resource lloc tion is lso most efficient in the optim l uction mech nism. Key words : uction mech nism; complement; lloc tion efficiency; incentive comp tibility 1 , , . , , FCC 1994 . FCC , . . P lfrey[ 1] ( 1983 ) , . Levin[ 2] . Cr mton[ 3] Br nco[ 4] . [ 5] . ; [ 6] , [7] [8] ; , ; . . : 2005-08-15 : ( : ( 1976- ) , , , , , E-m il: Am nd yh@ 163. com; ( 1957- ) ,