终极控制权、掏空和公司治理--基于控股股东资金占用的研究.pdfVIP

终极控制权、掏空与公司治理∗ ——基于控股股东资金占用的研究 俞红海 徐龙炳 （上海财经大学金融学院，200433 ） The ultimate control right, tunneling and corporate governance -The research based on cash holding of controlling shareholder Yu Honghai Xu Longbing (School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433) Abstract: Based on La Porta et al.(1999), this paper uses cash holding of ultimate controlling shareholder to study the relationship between tunneling, controlling right, cash flow right and corporate governance under nonlinear framework. Research results show that the coefficient of control right is significantly positive to cash holding, and when the controlling shareholder is the government, this effect is more significant, while in general cash flow right couldn’t constrain tunneling as the theory predicts. Besides, the high compensation of management and the little government interference could constrain tunneling, while other governance mechanisms couldn’t constrain tunneling. In addition, when the controlling shareholder has absolute control right, the control right has significant positive affect to tunneling, while when comparative controlling, there is no such relationship. When the cash flow right is high, it could constrain tunneling, while low, it could not constrain. This research improve the understanding of controlling shareholder, tunneling and corporate governance, and also provide some policy implication to constrain tunneling. Key Words: Tunneling, Control right, Cash flow right, Cash holding, Corporate governance JEL classification: G31; G34; G38 作者简介 俞红海，男，浙江嘉兴人，2002 年毕业于浙江工业大学，获管理学学士学位，2006 年毕业于南京财 经大学，获经济学（金融）硕士学位。2006 年9 月起在上海财经大学金融学院攻读金融学博士学位，其中 2007 年10 月-2008 年11 月，美国南加州大学马歇尔商学院访问学者。 徐龙炳，男，江苏丹徒人，金融