发电企业经营博弈过程中的效仿行为仿真研究.pdfVIP

　2006 年 11 月 系统工程理论与实践 第 11 期 　 ( ) 文章编号 2006 发电企业经营博弈过程中的效仿行为仿真研究 任玉珑 ,刘 　贞 ,粟增德 ,曹 　杨 (重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 ,重庆 400030) 摘要 : 　提出一种基于 Swarm 的仿真模型 ,对信息不完全市场下发电企业经营过程中的静态 、动态和学 习演化行为进行仿真. 模型刻画了发电企业利用在博弈过程中所获取的信息 ,不断修正自己行为规则的 演化过程. 通过仿真发现 :具有效仿能力的发电企业的平均供电量高于不具有效仿能力的发电企业 ;市 场退出机制能够促进发电企业进行行为优化 ,最终生存在市场上的是能够准确预测对手的发电商 ,此时 发电企业平均供电量高于无市场退出机制下发电企业 ;在无退出机制下 , 由于缺乏优化决策的激励 ,采 用优化博弈模型的发电企业的个数较少. 关键词 : 　发电市场 ;动态博弈 ;演化博弈 ;模仿行为 ;Swarm 仿真 中图分类号 : 　TM73 ;F1239 　　　　　　　　文献标志码 : 　A 　　　 Research on Imitative Behavior in Business Game Process of Power Plant REN Yulong , L IU Zhen , SU Zengde , CAO Yang ( Economy and Management School , Chongqing University , Chongqing 400030 ,China) Abstract: 　Imitative behavior is major factor which effects on equilibrium of electricity market because power suppliers in inferior position could imitate the game behavior of other power suppliers in the game process. A simulation model base on Swarm was proposed. In business game process with incomplete information , the static game behavior , dynamic game behavior and evolutionary game behavior of power suppliers were simulated. The model characterized the evolutionary game process in which power suppliers making use of the obtained information and continually modifies their behavior rule . Result showed that the average power supply of suppliers with imitative behavior is higher than those without imitative behavior . The quit mechanism in market prompts power suppliers to optimize their game behavior . The power sup