组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch04 Coase theorem.ppt

Chapter 4 Coase theorem George Hendrikse Allocation of property rights (Coase) Missing market Create a market for externalities Possible solutions for the externality problem Taxes Internalise externality Allocation of property rights Suppose that pollution rights are established. These rights can be allocated in various ways. Case 1: Camping owns pollution rights. Is the equilibrium # of pollution for the camping equal to 0 ? If bargaining results in a price of 17, then the first unit of pollution results in a Pareto-improvement, where the firm gains 50-17=33 and the camping 17-0=17. Equilibrium # pollution is A units of pollution when the camping owns the pollution rights. What is the gain in surplus when you move from 0 units of pollution to A units of pollution? Case 2: Firm owns pollution rights Is the equilibrium amount of pollution of the firm equal to B? Equilibrium # pollution is also A units of pollution when the firm owns the pollution rights. What is the gain in surplus when you move from B units of pollution to A units of pollution? Conclusion Equilibrium # pollution is A, regardless the allocation of property rights. Coase Theorem Assumptions1. Efficient bargaining All surplus generating exchange occurs, i.e. the allocation of resources is such that the total surplus (CS + PS) is maximised. There is also no delay in reaching this outcome. However, the bargaining environment may be such that efficient outcomes do not occur, e.g. asymmetric information. Solution Consider alternatives for markets to mitigate bargaining problems, e.g. exchange in firms. Assign property rights to the person with the best local information. There are no wealth effects when choices can be expressed in money; (Not always: fight as a volunteer for Saddam; move to Iran as a catholic; sell your child.) choices do not depend on wealth position; there are no financial restrictions regarding establishing a deal. This final assumption is realistic when the am