组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch09 Property rights theory.ppt

Chapter 9 Property rights theory George Hendrikse Transaction costs economics (Williamson) Property rights theory Grossman and Hart (1986) Hart and Moore (1990) It is not consistent to assume that, in an integrated enterprise, people do not behave opportunistically anymore. Strategic situation Firm A collection of physical assets that are jointly owned. Ownership entails the possession of the residual decision rights. Questions in property rights theory What determines the size of the firm? Who has decision authority in the firm? How do outsiders employ organisational and financial means (voting rights, power of board of directors, debt / equity ratio) to control insiders/agents? Emphasis in property rights theory (following Coase) Bargaining aspects Financial limitations Three stage game First stage: Governance structure choice Second stage: Investment choice Third stage: Honour contract choice The choice of governance structure determines the bargaining strength / power, which is summarised by the Shapley value.  ‘Asset ownership’ and ‘being essential / indispensable’ is captured by the Shapley value. The choice of investment (level of asset specificity) determines the bargaining position. Start with analysing the second and third stage of the game, while taking a certain first stage decision as given. Result An investor is willing to worsen his bargaining position (by choosing K0) when he is assigned a lot of bargaining power in the choice of governance structure. (This gives him confidence that he receives his money back.) ImplicationAn owner-manager invests more when he owns more assets. Example: Developing software Cost of investment: 200 Sunk costs: K Value of investment: 240 Division of quasi-surplus in governance structure Forward integration: 100 – 0 Vertical integration: 50 – 50 Backward integration: 0 – 100 Which governance structures result in the efficient investment decisions? It depends on the level of K. Every governance structure res