组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch10 Self-enforcing contracts.pptVIP

Chapter 10 Self-enforcing contracts George Hendrikse Folk theorem Prisoners dilemma Aside: experimental evidence regarding the Prisoners Dilemma Observation:Nash regarding these experimental resultsThe flaw in the experiment as a test of equilibrium point theory is that the experiment really amounts to having the players play one large multi-player game. One cannot just as well think of the thing as a sequence of independent games as one can in zero-sum cases. There is just too much interaction … (AER, 2001, p 1403). A non-cooperative game consists of 5 ingredients Players Actions Payoffs Information structure Rules of the game The Folk theorem resolves the prisoners dilemma The Folk theorem is able to resolve the prisoners dilemma because it changes the rules of the game by playing the prisoners dilemma repeatedly. It entails that current bad behaviour can be punished in the future. Figure 10.1: Folk theorem Figure 10.2: Discounted payoffs in the repeated prisoners dilemma for the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy as well as the grim strategy Figure 10.3: The costs and benefits of the choice T when the other player chooses the grim strategy The Folk theorem and long term relationships According the Folk theorem the stability of long term relationships is determined by: the history of the relationship observability of decisions costs and benefits of finishing a relationship TrustRelational contractsReciprocity Formal authority resides at the top, while real authority can be delegated or not. There is a tradeoff between: search incentives for the employee private activities of the employee Self-enforcing contracts and asset ownership The incentive to renege depends on who owns the asset because it determines the bargaining positions. Economics and Management of Organisations: Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy Player 2 Player 1 S T S (2,2) (-1,3) T (3,-1) (0,0) In 1950 the PD game was repeated 100 times wi