组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch14 Coordination.ppt

Chapter 14 Coordination George Hendrikse Positioning Fundamental welfare theorem All coordination problems will be resolved perfectly by the price mechanism in a market system, under certain circumstances. There is a unique equilibrium. Coordination problem A situation with more than one equilibrium. Example:Norwegian Dream Two Nash equilibria Containership: Go Norwegian Dream: Stop and Containership: Stop Norwegian Dream: Go Reduce the number of equilibria to 1. Four types of solutions Generate extra information Change payoffs Eliminate a player Change the choice possibilities 1. Generate extra information Common background Coordination device / mechanism Example Generate extra information by introducing traffic rules on the sea, like ‘right’ has priority. One equilibrium emerges - Containership: Go - Norwegian Dream: Stop 2. Change the payoffs Example The captain of the Norwegian Dream pays the captain of the Panamese containership an amount 5 when he stops. - Containership: Stop - Norwegian Dream: Go 3. Change the players Example Eliminate one player, e.g. by forbidding cruise ships on the North Sea. One equilibrium emerges Containership: Go 4. Change the choice possibilities Example Reduce the number of choices, e.g. install equipment which automatically stops the engine of the cruiseship when a ship is spotted on the right. One equilibrium emerges - Containership: Go - Norwegian Dream: Stop Generate additional information by using a coordination device. There are many coordination mechanisms / devices which might resolve the coordination problem. Criteria for evaluating coordination devices / mechanisms (Efficiency) Does mechanism achieve efficient decision when all information is available? (Complexity) Is the coordination device simple (not complex)? (Robustness) How brittle is the coordination mechanism regarding bad information? Example: Symphony orchestra Two coordination devices: Prices Conductor Coordination device prices Yes No No Yes Y