Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game文献.pdfVIP

PHYSICA ELSEVIER Physica A 246 (1997) 407~,18 Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game D. Challet, Y.-C. Zhang * Institut de Physique ThOorique, POrolles, Universitd de Fribourg, 1700 Fribour9, Switzerland Received 8 August 1997 Abstract A binary game is introduced and analysed. N players have to choose one of the two sides independently and those on the minority side win. Players use a finite set of ad hoc strategies to make their decision, based on the past record. The analysing power is limited and can adapt when necessary. Interesting cooperation and competition patterns of the society seem to arise and to be responsive to the payoff function. Keywords: Evolution; Game; Emergence of organization Most current economics theories are deductive in origin. One assumes that each participant knows what is best for him given that all other participants are equally intelligent in choosing their best actions. However, it is recently realised that in the real world the actual players do not have the perfect foresight and hindsight, most often their actions are based on trial-and-error inductive thinking, rather than the de- ductive rationale assuming that there are underlying first principles. Whether deductive or inductive thinking is more relevant is still under debate [1]. Evolutionary games have also been studied within the standard framework of game theory [2]. However, it has been recently pointed o