Finite State Analysis of IKE Finite State Analysis of IKE.pdfVIP

Finite State Analysis of IKE Page 1 of 8 Finite State Analysis of IKE by : Udayan Kumar, Y.Narendra, and Rakesh Upadhyay, 05/30/2005 /library/3333 IP Security Protocol (IPSEC) Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE) [1], a key exchange protocol. The main purpose of its development is to provide the security support for client protocols of the Internet Protocol. It is being designed to do much more than just distribute keys, it can also be used to establish Security Associations that specify such things as the protocol format used, the cryptographic and hashing algorithms used, and other necessary features for secure communication. For incorporating flexibility, it supports a number of different types of key exchange options, including digital signatures, public key encryption, and conventional encryption using shared keys. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used to generate shared key material. The IKE protocol has evolved from ISAKMP [2] and Oakley [3]. It can be thought of as combination of these two protocols. ISAKMP provides a framework for establishing security associations and cryptographic keys, but does not prescribe any particular authentication mechanism. Indeed, ISAKMP is supposed to integrate with a number of security protocols. Oakley, on the other hand, is a suite of key agreement protocols in which two parties generate a key jointly. A typical key establishment protocol proceeds in one phase, in which two parties use master keys to establish shared keying material. IKE, however, proceeds in two such phases. In the first phase, two entities use master keys to agree, not only on keying material, but on the various mechanisms (e.g. cryptographic algorithms, hash functions, etc.), that they will use in the second phase. The keying material and set of mechanisms thus agreed upon is