International Economic Review.docVIP

1、SOCIAL CHANGE: THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION. In 1900 only 6% of unwed teenage females engaged in premarital sex. Now, three quarters do. The sexual revolution is studied here using an equilibrium matching model, where the costs of premarital sex fall over time due to technological improvement in contraceptives. Individuals differ in their desire for sex. Given this, people tend to circulate in social groups where prospective partners share their views on premarital sex. To the extent that societys customs and mores reflect the aggregation of decentralized decision making by its members, shifts in the economic environment may induce changes in what is perceived as culture. 2、A COMPUTATIONALLY PRACTICAL SIMULATION ESTIMATION ALGORITHM FOR DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODELS WITH UNOBSERVED ENDOGENOUS STATE VARIABLES. This article develops a simulation estimation algorithm that is particularly useful for estimating dynamic panel data models with unobserved endogenous state variables. Repeated sampling experiments on dynamic probit models with serially correlated errors indicate the estimator has good small sample properties. We apply the estimator to a model of female labor supply and show that the rarely used Polya model fits the data substantially better than the popular Markov model. The Polya model also produces far less state dependence and many fewer race effects and much stronger effects of education, young children, and husbands income on female labor supply decisions. 3、ON MAJORITARIAN BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohns ( American Political Science Review 83 (1989), 1181-206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Of many findings, we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer; (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns, the offer concern à la Spences signaling (the higher the type the better) and the coalition inclusion concern in a majority co