多任务特许经营情景下的信息甄别的研究.pdfVIP

多任 务特 许 经 营情 景 下 的信 总甄 别研 宄 A b str a c t W ith the features of low inv estm ent, low risk and rap id expan sion , F ranch ise bu siness m ode is w idely adopted in different indu stries and becom e an interestin g theoretical research top ic. U sually，fran ch isee needs to perform m u ltip le task s: product prom otion and sales, advertising, after-sale service, etc. H ow ever, few studies have paid attention to the m odeling prob lem of m ulti-task feature in franch ising relation sh ip . In th is pap er, w e analyze this top ic based on principal-agent theory since franchising is considered as one of the m ost typ ical exam p le in that field. Principal-agent problem has already b een deep ly discussed over decades. T here is a large body of literature focu sin g on both of its theoretical an d app lication values. M u lti-task principal-agent m odel is one of its m ajor extensions, w h ich is adopted in our paper as m odeling basis. Furtherm ore, the efforts franch isee spend on som e types of task s (e.g. after-sale service) are difficu lt to observe，m easure or verify，w hich then becom e fran chisees private inform ation as a resu lt. Such inform ation asym m etry is the essential feature of principal-agent theory. C orrespondingly, the core question franch isor needs to solve is how to reveal it and design optim al agent incentive p lan . H en ce, w e con sider both m u lti-task an d inform ation screen in g prob lem s in franch ising relation sh ip . In our m odel, franch isee perform s tw o task s :production task and m aintenan ce task . W e com bine m oral hazard an d adv erse selection together by assum ing that m aintenance effort is franch isees private inform ation w h ile production effort level is unob servab le. T he franchisors objective is to design a m echanism to rev